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CHAPTER I
THE NIMBY CONTROVERSY
Introduction
The American public's concern with protecting natural resources can be traced to
Theodore Roosevelt's establishment of a national park system in the early 1900's. It was not,
however, until Rachel Carson's book Silent Spring in 1962 that the American public was
awakened to the dangers that modern industrial society poses to the environment. Silent Spn'ng
introduced the public to the science of ecology, which studies the way the environment is affected
and sometimes ultimately changed by actions caused by either man or nature.
NIMBY, "not in my back yard" (Lake, 1987), TIMBY "threat in my back yard" (Focht,
1989), and NIABY "not in anybody's back yard" (Heiman 1990; Portney 1991; Freudenberg and
Steinsapir, 1992), are terms that have arisen from the turbulent environmental climate of the
years since Silent Spring. NIMBY and TIMBY citizens activists groups are the result of the
political unrest and often-adversarial confrontations of citizens with government and industry as
they attempt to solve the environmental problems in their neighborhoods.
NIMBY and TIMBY groups are quite distinct from the mainstream national organizations
such as the Sierra Club. Freudenberg and Steinsapir (1992) found that mainstream national
environmental interest groups are dominated by white middle class males, are well funded, and
focus on environmental and ecological issues. They also tend to work closely with industry and
government in policy making and tend to work for change within the existing power structure.
Community-based NIMBY groups tend to be led by females and are composed of a membership
that is more representative of the local community's races, classes, and occupations. They focus
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their efforts on human health issues and have a high distrust of government and 'industry. which
adds to their willingness to engag.e in nontraditional protest activities (Focht 1995:20-21).
Freudenburg and Pastor (1992) provide a historical view of NIMBY research. Early
research tended to "blame the victim" by charging that NIMBY activists were ignorant and/or
irrational. Later stages attempted to "understand the victim" by viewing activists as exhibiting
rationally selfish or prudent behavior. The authors suggest that we are entering a new stage in
which research attempts to understand the system that creates victims and victimization in the
first place (Focht 1995).
Increasingly. citizens have lost trust in government agencies that were formed to protect
them. According to Edelstein (1988:125), the "toxic peril has moved people so far up the scale of
suspicion that they come to distrust not only public officials and experts. not only the social order
and the natural world. but also the very ethos of science and technology." In fact. Bord and
O'Connor (1992) showed that people do not trust risk assessments that conflict with well-fonned
cultural beliefs (e.g., global warming risk infonnation is trusted, hazardous waste facility risk
information is not). SCientific risk assessments and technical decision criteria are also distrusted
because they effectively isolate the lay public from effective participation in the decision-making
process (Bord and O'Connor 1992).
Citizens have learned that by banding together and using the expertise of groups already
formed, they can influence the location, operation, and practices of government siting of
undesirable facilities and business. Environmental groups are not interested in tokenism; they
not only want to be invited to the party, they want a place at the table. According to one
environmental activist, they want to be heard and their opinions considered and included In the
final decision.
Grassroots environmental protest groups are usually formed to meet a local problem and
then disbanded when a settlement or solution is reached. As Oklahorna has witnessed multiple
environmental crises, individuals have learned they have the talent as well as the burning desire
to protect the state's land, water, air, and people from pollution. As grassroots groups formed
across the state. they began to form coalitions and alliances to share experiences. As
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-environmental awareness grew so did their desire ,and determination to share with other citizens.
NIABY, "not in anybody's backyard," and environmental justice grew from this movement (Focht
1995). The citizens wanted sound environmental practices and justice for everyone.
Probably nothing has both rallied the Oklahoma citizens, and split them apart, as the
siting of hazardous waste incinerators and injection wells, nuclear waste repositories. and
attempts to dispose of New York sludge in rural locations in the state. These attempts have
divided the townspeople, destroyed business in tocal communities, and pitted family members
against each other as they tak.e sides in hazardous waste siting and cleanup disputes. From
these ashes came a determination to demand accountability from both government and industry.
Oklahoma, with wide open spaces, has been described as a backward state with friendly,
helpful, but environmentally uneducated people, who are often viewed as an easy target for
bearers of all types of wastes that no one else wants (Environmental activist). The sovereign
nation status of the Indian lands has lured many undesirable projects that promise quick and easy
money to an impoverished but proud Indian people. City fathers in many small towns, in a
desperate struggle to lure new industry, have often looked through rose-colored glasses at the
projects proposed. They are often seen as selling their city's soul for the price of a few minimum
wage jobs as they struggle with a declining oil based economy.
Previous Studies of Siting Controversies In Oklahoma
A team of researchers made up of faculty and graduate students from Oklahoma State
University from multiple academic backgrounds conducted a stUdy of seven controversial waste
management disputes in Oklahoma under the direction of Dr. Will Focht (see Adams (1993),
Allenbach (1994), Harney (1994), Focht (1995), Bosma (1996), and Lacy (1998). These disputes
were chosen because they represent typical NIMBY and TIMBY type controversies. Of the seven
communities, Ponca City and Cushing represented the TIMBY controversy and were considered
"brownfield communities," already having contamination in their communities and facing
controversial c,leanup operations. Boise City, Ramona, and Haystack were NIMBY controversies,
communities facing hazardous waste siting proposals. Alva and Pryor were included as
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"greenfie'ld communities" because contamination was not present, so the fields were green. The
results obtained from the study of the seven communittes (including Ponca City) has been
published (Focht, 1995). This study will focus on Ponca City. a "brownfield" TIMBY community
with contamination already present.
NIMBYfTlMBY conflicts arise because citizens refuse to accept the involuntary imposition
of uncertain risk without due consideration to all salient criteria. Perceived illegitimacy of the
decision-making process results from the failure of elite decision-makers to include non-technlical
criteria in the decision calculus. Since these criteria involve cognitive, political, social, cultural,
and ethical values, direct and substantive citizen participation in the decision-making process is
necessary to resolve environmental disputes and stalemates.
Previous approaches to solve the NIMBYfTlMBY problem have met with little success.
We believe they have been unsuccessful because they fail to address the root causes of
NIMBYfTlMBY resistance-widespread institutional distrust and associated "crises of legitimacy"
(Focht. 1995).
Research Goals of This Project
We believe that the solution to the NIMBY phenomenon requires citizen empowerment.
A solution to the problem must increase the public's perception of the legitimacy of the declsion-
making process and, therefore, the decision itself. Decision legitimacy can be defined as the
willingness of citizens to voluntarily accept the decisions of its government, even when they go
against self-interest. NIMBY seems to represent an obvious rejection of government claims of
legitimacy in its locational claims. Any solution to NIMBY, we believe, must address perceived
decision legitimacy.
Our research is based on the premise that the crisis of legitimacy is based on two factors:
(1) the failure of decision-makers to adequately consider non-technical criteria and (2) the
pervasive public distrust of government and industry. These factors work in synergy to escalate
citizen oppos.ition in what Renn et al. (1992) refer to as "the social amplification of risk."
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Trust is the other ingredient necessary in designing a solution to the NIMBY phenomenon
(Mitchell 1992; English 1992). Trust is a complex concept that includes perception of
competence, credibility, openness, predictability, and acting in the ~ublic interest." Decision-
makers may not be trusted if they fail to consider criteria that the public deems salient or fail to
consider them in a manner that reflects the public interest.
The goal of our research is to (1) identify the decision criteria salient to disputes and (2)
identify the political participation strategy that can foster consensus.
With our research analysis, and why one town (Cushing) reached a settlement without
confrontation and the other (Ponca City) didn't, the researchers hope to add to the body of the
I,iterature on NIMBYITIMBY. With this knowledge, understanding may follow that may allow us to
be attuned not only to our differences but also to our commonality.
The National Resource Council (1992) states that knOWledge often fails to resolve
controversy. It frequently raises new disputes or calls old beliefs into question. And even when
new knowledge reduces uncertainty, controversies persist because not only facts, but also
important interests and values are at stake. Informed people disagree because the remaining
uncertainty leaves room for jUdgment, because they may assume different scenarios about the
future of society, and because an outcome that harms what one person values may enhance
what another values. In short, the debates are not only about the workings of human and
environmental systems, but also about political and economic interests, conflicting values and
faiths, differing assumptions about the future, and different judgments about resiliency in the face
of the unexpected (Focht 1995:1). This observation about environmental controversy captures
the tone and substance of this study of NIMBY conflict. The NIMBY phenomenon is about
controversy, uncertain knowledge, clashing values and interests, and differing paradigmatic views
about what is best for society and its future (Focht 1995:1).
By discovering the nature of citizen activists' concerns in these communities, the
environmental decision-making criteria they believe to be important, and the pUblic participation
strategies they prefer, we hope to determine if and how present decision-making methods can be
modified to facilitate legitimacy.
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Opponents in brownfield oommunities, especially those that live in or near
contaminated areas, are concemed with the presence of an environmental threat
(actual or perceived) already existing. Controversies tend to concern remediation of
the contamination; Le., if, how and when to remove the threat, and how much.
Supporters. on the other hand, argue. often quite convincingly, that the entire
community is benefited economically by the polluting industry. This 'love-hate'
reaction among community residents aggravates the conflict. A reservoir of trust
often exists in brownfield communities based on familiarity and recognition of
"compensating benefits (Looney, 1997:3).
What went wrong in Ponca City? Could the cleanup have proceeded without the
turmoil and unrest that tore the town apart and made headlines across the nation? Could
Ponca City have avoided the negative publicity and title of "Ponca City's Own Love Canal"
(Environmental activist).
This paper focuses on Ponca City, a company town that experienced a problem with
hydrocarbon contamination traced to earlier refinery practices of the oil industry that made this
town such a success.
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CHAPTER II
CASE HISTORY
The Circle Drive Controversy
Ponca City grew from a small town settled on the prairie in the Cherokee Run in 1893 to
a town with a high income, well-educated population of 26,359 in 1990. Located in north central
Oklahoma 102 miles north of Oklahoma City, Ponca City is the largest city in Kay County.
In 1911 E.W. Marland discovered oil and began to store it in tanks around the city. By
1916, he had constructed the area's first petroleum refinery. By 1925 Marland had amassed a
vast oil empire worth over 100 million dollars. On April 30, 1929 he purchased the Continental Oil
Company from J. P. Morgan in exchange for Marland Oil Company stock, and moved its
headquarters to Ponca City. He buih the Marland Mansion. a "Palace on the Prairie," modeled
after the Devananzatti Palace in Florence, Italy. The mansion was the scene of some of the most
lavish social functions where dignitaries and royalty dined, were entertained, attended lavish
balls, and rode horses on fox-hunts on the prairie. The mansion cost 5.5 million dollars and took
three years to complete (The mansion and estate were purchased by the city of Ponca City in
1975 and are now open to the public. The mansion has been placed on the National Register of
Historic Places).
Marland's employees enjoyed the benefits of secure high-income jobs with a company
that offered security until retirement. Marland believed employees should be paid not just a living
wage but a saving wage, and he declared he intended to "water the people like flowers, water
them with money and watch them bloom" (John Joseph Mathews, 1951). In addition to funding a
hospital, an orphanage, lands for public schools, the city's civic auditorium, and a free golf course
with free lessons, he built housing for his employees, which they could rent or bUy on terms they
set themselves. Some of these houses, both for workers and managers, were constructed in the
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-southeast section of Ponca City, over a mile east of the Marland refinery. At that time, a
substantial buffer zone separated the inhabitants from the small refinery.
The Company was, and still is, the largest employer in town, the backbone of the city,
and the benevolent force of the town. Marland would lose, regain, and lose his fortune again over
the years due to his spending, gambling, and bad investments. By Marland's death in 1941, he
had transformed Ponca City into one of the wealthiest cities in Oklahoma with beautiful homes on
stately tree-lined streets. The economic success of ~he town was such that public bus
transportation has never been economical, and a lone taxi company today supplies all pUblic
transportation neces~ary. There were too many cars in the garages. Marland and succeeding oil
companies contributed stability, money, and prestige to the small community.
Ponca City still is a company town dependent on the current refinery owner, Conoeo, for
economic viability. Many of the citizens and city government officials believe that without Conoeo
(purchased in 1978 by DuPont), the economic base of the town will be destroyed.
Circle Drive Community
The Circle Drive community lies on the southem, lower geographically end of Ponca City
and is bordered on the west by the Conoco Refinery and the east by open fields, a highway and
the Arkansas River. The Circle Drive area is the oldest part of town, haVing been built during the
operation of the Marland Oil Company.
The Circle Drive residents were older, many retired, poorer, and more ethnically diverse
than the citizens in the rest of the town. The community was close knit; multiple generations
resided only a few houses from each other, sometimes three generations, on quiet tree-lined
streets. Doors were often left unlocked and children rode their bikes, roamed free and played
under the light of Conoeo's flares. "You didn't worry about the kids, everybody looked out after
everyone else. If your child fell off his bike someone would care for him and bring him homeR
(interview with a former Circle Drive resident). The community was a large extended family with
most of the homes owner-occupied. The education level was from grade school to graduate
school. A grocery store, exercise room, and laundromat supplied necessary services. There
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-were churches and a local school. The community had a playground that bordered on a 'crement
lined creek known as Hoover Ditch or Hoover Creek but more popularly known as "Acid Creek"
because of the odor and color of the drainage at times. While Circle Drive was a pa'rt of Ponca
City it was actually a community unto itself. Many of the residents had worked or were still
working for Conoco or its predecessors. All had family or friends that had worked for C<1noco.
Their ties were strong to both their community and the company.
There had been problems in the past but in general the Circle Drive residents'
relationship with Conoco was good. During times of strong Odors wafting over the community,
most Circle Drive residents considered it part of living next to a refinery. 'We have lived with that
stuff for years. lfs just part of the deal of living in a refinery town" (interview with former Circle
Drive resident). One who enters the town from the south is often greeted with offensive refinery
odors. Nevertheless over time the Circle Drive residents had become acclimated to the smells,
and often, other town residents would say "it smelled like money."
One of Ponca City's attractions for early settlers was the abundant supply of fresh water.
The refinery is located upon an ancient alluvial terrace (created by the accumulation of sediments
in the flood plain due to frequent flooding) 'that lies between the Salt Fork of the Arkansas River,
the Arkansas River itself, and the Bois D'Arc creek. These alluvial terrace deposits are sources
of ground water in this area. The aquifer Is comprised of saturated sands and gravels from two to
twenty-five feet thick and lies between ten and sixty feet below ground surface under the Conoco
refinery. The aquifer outcrops (comes to the surface) In and to the east of the Circle Drive
neighborhood. The groundwater flow velocity through the formation is 85 to 115 feet per day.
Groundwater wells completed in this formation can yield 50 t0150 gpm (Conoco, 1988). The
exact locations of discharge to the surface depend upon the water table elevation, which In tum
depends upon the amount of rainfall recharging the aquifer. Following periods of heavy rainfall,
the water table rises so high as to discharge at ground surface at several locations in the Circle
Drive area (Focht 1989, paper presented at the Oklahoma Academy of Sciences). Even In dry
periods, seepage occurs at the surface in isolated areas, resulting in marshes and wet patches
that cannot be mowed, and into the ditches in the neighborhood.
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-The first evidence of serious hydroearbon, oontamination in 'Ponca City was discovered in
about 1959. By that time, a second refinery had been built on land that had once separated the
Circle Drive community from the old Marland refinery. The newer east refinery operated under a
number of owners, including Pioneer, Sequoia. and Cities Service, until its eventual purchase and
annexation by Conoeo. In 1959, no one in the Circle Drive area objected when Conoeo and
Sequoia started voluntarily pumping refined 011 products from the city sewer system passing
under their homes. Apparently, no one knew. A well at Circle Drive and five other wells
reportedly pumped until the city well was dry, then the project was abandoned. later when the
Ponca City Toxic Concemed Citizens, (PCTCC) examined the Oklahoma Water Resources
Board's files they learned of the pumping and it became general knowledge in the community.
In July 1968, at the residence 113 Mercer Street, gas vapors had risen from the
basement, ignited and caused a "minor" explosion, which in tum had started a flow of oil from a
nearby spring at the 7th Street Bridge. A neighbor remembers the fire trucks that came to the
residence hosing down the streets in the neighborhood causing a massive flooding of Acid Creek.
"The sewers were flooded and vented. Fire hydrants were left running all summer" (interview with
former resident of area). Within a week wells were drilled in the Circle Drive area on Sequoia
property and, according to a Hydroearbon Recovery ·Report filed with the state by Conoeo and
Sequoia, the magnitude of oil where found was considerably more than what was found In 1959.
Other Circle Drive property owners were also experiencing seepage of contaminated
water into their homes. Complaints about odors and fumes were lodged with city and county
officials and were reported in 1969 to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, which at that time
had sole jurisdiction over oil matters in the state. As a result of the complaints Conoco and the
city installed a network of recovery well that yielded enough good petroleum products that the city
sold half a million barrels to Conoeo between 1969 and 1972. The recovery process was halted
due to, in Conoeo' words. "lack of recoverable hydrocarbons and the increasing depth of the
groundwater caused by the effects of massive pumping" (Conoeo, 1972).
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The following year, Conoeo settled a class action suit filed by almost 200 Circle Drive
residents for $265,000 for compensation for medical bills and property damage. Conoeo denied
any responsibility, attributing the problems to "earlier refinery operations."
March 1974: Just as lunch recess was beginning a cloud of vapors from an airborne
discharge at the refinery drifted over McKinley Elementary School. Both students and teachers
began feeling unwell. Fire trucks and ambulances were dispatched to the scene and transported
a number of students. teachers, and loeal residents to the hospital, where some were admitted.
The Ponca City News reported assurances from the Conoeo plant manager that the "odoranr
released from one of their west plant operations was harmless, a claim verified by Conoeo's
Industrial hygienist. The paper also printed speculation that the incident was the result of mass
hysteria and sub-headed it's second installment of three reports, "Odor Excitement Ebbs."
Shortly thereafter McKinley school was closed, officially for reasons of low enrollmel1t (Tulsa
World, March 15, 1976).
November 1985: Orange, sludgy water began leaking into Charles Holick's basement.
His finished basement rooms were ruined by the "foul smelling," sticky oily residue. Knowing the
history of the neighborhood, Holick contacted Conoeo with his concerns. He had at one time
worked for Conoeo and was sure the problem would be satisfactorily resolved. Conoeo's early
replies to Holick suggested "the problem was caused by rotting juniper berries and the orange
color was rust and the smell stagnation." Upstairs a black residue was collecting on the ceiling
and dripping to the floor. A brown moldy substance gathered on the walls. HoUck continued to
correspond with Conoeo and they in tum suggested he pump out his basement and try to
rehabilitate his house with better maintenance. Conoeo offered to supply Holick a sump pump if
he would sign papers releasing Conoeo from all liability for the problem. Conoeo Insisted the
water in the basement was harmless but the U.S. EPA would not allow him to pump the water
into the street and the city would not allow him to pump it into the city sewer system. The fumes
coming from the basement caused the Holick family to spend many nights elsewhere and
eventually to move (interview with Holick).
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Almost a year after Holick complained of contamination, Ponca City had a record rainfall
of over 22 inches in the months of September and October 1986 (Ponca City Municipal Airport
Month and Yearly Precipitation and Temperature Report). Hoover Ditch, which drained outfall
003 with its bright orange drainage, exhibited an oily sheen. A cup of the liquid flared bnghtly
when ignited with a match (interview with area resident). A black gooey mass oozed up In the
basements of some of the low-lying homes. On the playground water puddles collected the black
ooze. The residents were fearful for the children playing near Hoover Creek next to the school.
However, "Conoeo and Ponca CitY officials noted that the U.S. EPA and Oklahoma State Health
Department determined the smelly, chemical-laced water is not a health hazard" (The Daily
Oklahoman, 11/09/86). State and local govemments, Conoco, and the majority of the
townspeople denied the threat. The Circle Drive residents felt desperate, alone, isolated and
ostraci,zed, by the larger community (interview with former Circle Drive resident).
Time Line of Events 1978 to 1990
1978 January: Attomey General opinion gives state permitting authority over refineries to
Oklahoma Water Resource Board (Attorney General office records #77-295, January 31,
1978).
May: OWRB conducts its first NPDES inspection: no problems found (OWRB records).
September: OWRB conducts its second NPDES permit inspection: no problems were
found (OWRB records).
1980 August: OWRB conducts its third NPDES inspection: no problems found (OWRB
records).
1981 July: OWRB conducts its fourth NPDES inspection: notes oil in sediments in Hoover
drainage ditch. Inspector recommends removal of sediment (OWRB records).
September: Conoeo responds to July 18, 1981 NPDES inspection. Conoeo agreed to
clean up oil in ditch by September 25,1981 (OWRB records).
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b1983 August: OWRB conducts its fifth NPDES inspection; notes problems with ,outfall 003 and
an unpermitted discharge from the 66" storm sewer; oil residue in Hoover ditch reported
by inspector (OWRB records).
November: Conoco responds to August 23, 1983 inspection. Conoco installed a sump
pump in the 66" storm sewer to prevent oil in the sewer from discharging into the ditch.
Also sides of ditch will be cleaned (OWRB records).
December: OWRB issues State Waste disposal permit to Conoco (OWRB records).
1984 February: U.S. EPA conducts NPDES inspection at Conoco-- notes oily discharge below
outfall 003 (OWRB records).
March: U.S. EPA summarizes problems with ditch below outfall 003 and proposes
Administrative Order if oil and grease problems below outfall 003 are not corrected
(OWRB records).
June: Conoco submits letter and photos shOWing action taken to address oil in ditch
below outfall 003 and from 66" storm sewer (OWRB records).
August: OWRB complaint investigation initiated by informal telephone report from Kay
County Health Department. Report complained of hydrocarbon contamination in Hoover
ditch and possible groundwater contamination. Investigation report noted that Conoco
was currently recovering hydrocarbon adjacent to the east side of property fence and that
groundwater seepage was entering the storm sewer. Hydrocarbon contamination was
also detected discharging from the old abandoned sanitary sewer In the Circle Drive
area. A compliance letter was scheduled for September to verify facts in complaint
investigation (OWRB records).
1985 February: The OWRB sent Conoeo a compliance letter requiring hydrogeologic
assessments of the area affected by outfall 003 (OWRB records).
April: OWRB conducts its seventh NPDES inspection; notes problems with ouffall 003.
Conoco provides OWRB with data on historic hydrocarbon recovery operations and with
generalized geologic and hydraulic information at the refinery (OWRB records).
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November: Hydrocarbons surface in Holick's basement (south Ponca City); he writes a
letter of complaint to Conoeo (OWRB records).
1986 January: Holick again contacts Conoeo by letter and asked for help with seepage into his
house and voices his concern of a possible health hazard (letter to Conoeo dated
1/1,4/1986).
January: Conoeo replied to Holick's letter by stating they udo not have pipe lines in the
area and are unable to help him" (Letter dated 1/22/1986).
February: U.S. EPA refers letter of complaint to OWRB. Complaint regards smelly
sludge water seeping into basement. OWRB investigates and finds low level
hydroearbon contamination (0.0031) ppm benzene. Complaint closed with city allowing
water in basement to be pumped into sanitary sewer. Contamination in groundwater to
be addressed in on-going inv~stigation bY,Conoeo (OWRB records).
July: OWRB conducts ninth NPDES inspection-notes problem with outfall 003 and once
again with groundwater seepage (OWAB records).
October: Holick writes a letter to the Vice President of Conoeo asking for help with water
contamination problem in his house (Letter dated 10/1/1986).
October: Conoeo replied to Holick's letter by suggests he install a sump pump and pump
out his basement to a udlscharge point approved by the city of Ponca City" (Letter dated
10/24/1986).
OCtober: Holick writes a letter to Canoeo asking If, uaccording to their test, Is it safe to
Jive in the house?" (Letter dated 10/27/1986).
October: Canoeo replied by letter to Holick stating that they do not believe Mit
appropriate" to answer the question, "is it safe to live in his house?" (letter dated
10/29/1986).
November: OWRB issues compliance letter to Conoco concerning petroleum discharge
into Omaha Creek, various surface spills, freeboard (possible spillage) problems in
lagoons, contaminated soils, and elevated benzene levels at outfall 003. OWRB requires
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-Conoco to conduct hydrologic study of area (with goal of possible remediation by
Conoco) (OWRB record). ~
November: The Ponca City Fire Department received a call from the Oklahoma State
Health Department concerning gas vapors at 113 Mercer. The Gas Trac Instrument was
taken to the resident and explosive levels of vapors were detected. They then proceeded
to 1501 South Sixth Street where volatile (not explosive) vapors were detected In the
basement. The Fire Marshal recommended that both buildings be vacated (Fire
Department Alarm report #441 dated 11/311986).
November: "Ponca City officials have detected volatile levels of gas pockets In
residential basements in south Ponca City. Hydrocarbons, apparently seeping Into
basements through ground water systems, have been detected in homes on Mercer and
Sixth Street. Officials from the Oklahoma State Health Department are analyzing
samples taken from the area. Offlcials say the area has suffered the same problems
from time to time for several years" (Ponca City News, 1113/1986).
November: City officials "investigating a gas leak in the circle Drive area speculated it
was part of an ·ongolng problem that had plagued the area since 1969" (Ponca City
News, 11/4/1986).
November: The Ponca City Fire Department received a call from the Oklahoma State
Department of Health conceming gas vapors at 113 Mercer. Atter Investigation and use
of the Gas Trac Instrument volatile (not explosive) vapors were found in the basement.
The Fire Departments recommended that the houses at 113 Mercer and 1501 South
Sixth be evacuated (Letter dated 11/4/1986).
November: Holick contacts his local attomey requesting legal advice, and possible
representation by the law firm, against Conaco. His attorney advises Holick to "attempt
to settle with Conoco." He also tells Holick that the firm cannot represent him in the case
because they will probably represent Conoco" (Letter from attomey to Holick dated
11/13/1986).
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November: Holick writes a Iletter to the Conoeo Ponca City Refinery manager explaining
the problem he is having with the contamination in his house and requesting a settlement
for the problem within 20 days. "Thereafter, I will employ an attorney and file suit" (Letter
dated 11/13/1986)-.
November: Holick receives a letter from Oklahoma State Health Department with results
of water samples taken from a drain leaving Holick's basement that show "weathered
gasoline of unknown origin present" (Letter to Holick from Oklahoma State Health
Department dated 11/26/1986).
December: A Conoeo letter to Holick states that he has had water in his basement for
over a year that he "could have cured by installing a sump pump." Conoco again offers
the use of a sump pump. "In connection with the installation of a sump pump, Conoco
will of course require that you sign a release of any and all claims against Conoeo with
respect to the house or your occupancy of the house" (Letter dated 12/2/1986).
December: A private lab in Oklahoma City ran tests on water samples from the
basement of the residence at 113 Mercer, findings indicate contamination by gasoline,
and aromatic constituents of gasoline. Chloroform, benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and
xylenes were found in the sample (Report from lab dated 12/17/1986).
1987 January: Conoeo responds to OWRB compliance letter with a plan to map area
geologically and hydrogeologically. No remediation addressed by Conoeo (OWRB
record).
February: OWRB sends Conoco a letter following agency review of groundwater
hydrocarbon assessment workplan. OWRB requests more information (OWRB record).
March: Conoeo provides OWRB w~h supplemental data for Phase I and product
recovery program (OWRB record).
April: OWRB conducts tenth NPDES permit inspection of Conoee-notes problem with
outfall 003 and groundwater (OWRB record).
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LMay: Phase I report submitted 10 OWRB/OSDH. Study addresses hydrology of area and
extent of hydroearbon contamination inside Conoeo property. For Phase II, Conoeo
proposes four areas of remedial activities:
-source definition and control
-Hydrologic controls
-groundwater and hydroearbon levels; and
-monitoring of surface water.
June: Conoeo meets with OWRB to discuss Phase I report. Conoeo predicts Phase II
(remediation) will take six months (OWRB record).
November: A Circle Drive resident holds a meeting in her home that leads to the
formation of Ponca City Toxic Concemed Citizens, (pCrCC), (Interview with PTCC
member).
December: Member of pcrce files a complaint with OWRB against Conoeo (complaint
referred to Department of Pollution Control) (OWRB record).
December: Holick invites public to tour his contaminated residence at 1501 S. Slh, Ponca
City, Ok.lahoma (Letter dated 12111/1987).
December: Conoeo reports they have a solution to the groundwater pollution but are
awaiting approval from state agencies. "U.S. EPA states that there are no long term
health dangers from exposure to the situation. Oklahoma State Department of Health
states fumes from diluted gasoline collecting Inside homes can cause respiratory
ailments" (Ponca City News, 12/ 31/1987).
December: "The U.S. EPA ruled last year that the present situation in the Circle Drive
area does not create long-term health dangers to local citizens, and recently Issued an
informal denial of Superfund requests to buyout homes affected by the problem."
"However, the Oklahoma Health Department Waste Management Services chief said
fumes from the diluted gasoline collecting inside homes can cause respiratory ailments"
(Ponca City News, 1213111987).
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1988 January: The Environmental Protection Agency agrees to take· air samples to determine
if the hydrocarbon-laden water poses any health dangers to peop1e Iiv'ng in affected
houses (Ponca City News, 1/15/1988).
January: Oklahoma Department of Pollution refers Holicks'1etter of complaint to the
Oklahoma State Department of Health (Letter dated 1/19/1988).
January: A New Hampshire laboratory. hired by the residents, tests a sludge sample from
Holick's basement and finds benzene, toluene, and xylene. U.S. EPA standards for
drinking water require no toluene or xylene, and benzene is limited to 5 ppb. (Report from
laboratory, 1/20/1988).
January: Preliminary state tests show petroleum products in the ground are old and
diluted, possible gasoline that was spilled 30 to 50 years earlier, and could cause
respiratory ailments. However, the Oklahoma State Health Department says the samples
do not indicate "immediate or significant health risks" (Ponca City News, 1/20/1988).
January: "The city's proposal to buy two homes affected by polluted groundwater was
refused by leaders of the Ponca City Toxic Concerned Citizens group last week." The
citizens group refused the offer "because it did not help the overall problem."
If the city can purchase the two properties, "Conoco will install equipment to lower the
rising groundwater table" (Ponca City News, 1/26/1988).
January: Call'ing the offer a "quick fix" for a problem that has plagued the neighborhood
for 20 years. Circle Drive residents refused the city's offer to bUy two homes that are
contaminated with groundwater pollution and to establish a pumping program for lowering
the ground water table in the area (PDnca City News, 1/27/1988).
January: Conoco ran a full page ad in the local paper explaining their position in the
ground water controversy. The ad stated the controversy started when more than 20
inches of rain fell in the area in late 1986. Conoco felt that they and the city had a good
plan to remove excess ground water from the Circle Drive area and solve the problem
(Ponca City News, 1/31/1988).
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-January: The plan (groundwater removal) had been presented to the Circle Drive
residents who turned the proposal down. The residents instead wanted Conoco to "buy
them out" (Ponca City News, 1/31/1988).
February: Holick again invites the public to an open house to view his contaminated
residence at 1501 South Sixth Street all day Saturday and Sunday (Ponca City News,
2/4/1988).
February: Conoeo groundwater assessment submitted to OWRB. Groundwater
assessment technical meeting held between OWRB, OSDH, DPC, EPA, and Conoeo.
Remediation of aquifer contamination proposed on Conoeo property as well as off-site
remediation (OWRB files).
February: Holick receives a letter from Oklahoma Governor Bellmon stating he is aware
of the problem and has forwarded a copy of Holick's letter to the Oklahoma State
Department of Pollution Control. The letter states that several state and federal agencies
are working to solve the matter (Letter dated 2/11/88).
February: A sign in the front yard of a PCTCC member said "For Sale Buy 'n Die." The
house is vacant, the residents moved out about 15 month ago. '" can't sell it, I can't rent
it, I can't live in it." Stated the former resident (The Daily Oklahoman, 2/W1988).
February: "Ponca City may be the test case that will clarify gray areas In federal law
governing the use of Superfund money alloeated to clean up America's hazardous waste
sites." Adrienne Anderson, western district director of The National Campaign Against
Toxic Hazardous, said today her organization hopes Ponca City will becorne a national
test case that will resolve an ambiguous clause in the Superfund law that excludes Its use
when the pollutant is a derivative of "petroleum and fractions thereof." "It will be a test
case and the eyes of the nation will be on Oklahoma and Ponca City," said Anderson
(Ponca City News, 2/23/1988).
February: Despite citizens demands for a full buyout of southeast Ponca City homes,
state and Ponca City officials endorsed a less expensive plan engineered by Conoeo
experts (Ponca City News, 2/24/1988).
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LFebruary: An overflow crowd of 500 people attended the Ponca City Toxic Concerned
Citizens meeting in the Ponca City High School auditorium. Chanting "we want out" the
group also blasted Governor Bellman for not personally honoring their request for his
attendance (Ponca City News, 2/24/1988).
February: Adriene Anderson, regional director of the National Toxics Campaign, a non-
profit environmental group, proclaims the Circle Drive neighborhood the worst situation
she has ever seen and c~J1s for an immediate evacuation (Ponca City News. 2/24/1988).
February: Chanting "we want our at a Tuesday meeting more than 700 people called tor
immediate evacuation of residents who~e homes are inundated with contaminated
groundwater and rejected the city's second offer to accept Conoco's plan to drain the
neighborhood. "Residents want the area to be evacuated immediately based on findings
of a hydrologist they hired. Those tests found chemicals in the groundwater which can
cause cancer and birth defects" (Daily Oklahoman, 2/24/1988).
February: Governor Bellmon makes a surprise visit to PoncC\ City. He states the
pollut,ion problem is "unfortunate," but indicated further state action will be delayed until
testing information is complete. Bellman said the state will respond as soon as all the
facts are determined. Ponca City Toxic Concerned Citizen spokeswomen said the group
is disappointed. "They are putting us on a prolonged hold while we're dying," she said
(Ponca City News, 2/25/1988).
February: The Ponca City Commissioners accepted Concx:;o's plan to clean up the
ground water problem in the south side of Ponca City. Most of the south side citizens
missed the meeting because they were unable to get into the meeting room because of
the packed house. John Lee was one of only two members of the concerned citizens
organization that got into the meeting room before police closed its doors. Lee Indicated
he thought residents should be evacuated at least temporarily until tests are complete or
conditions are improved. About 50 concerned citizens gathered outside; some held signs
that read, "Too little too I'ate" (Ponca City News, 2/28/1988).
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-A resident complained "the city meeting was packed with Conoeo employees hat was let
off work early (to attend) so the local Circle Drive residents would be unable to get in"
(Interview with former Circle Drive resident).
February: Holick and Daniel agree to sell their houses 'to the City for $25 square foot ~
value for new construction in town (Letter to City of Ponca City from Holick, 2/25/1988).
February: Ponca City Commissioners voted to bUy the two Circle Drive homes (Ponca
City Commissioners Meeting minutes, 2/26,1988).
February: Officials of the city and state approved the proposed clean up plan for the
Circle Drive area. Acceptance by local Circle Drive residents uncertain (Ponca City
News, 2/28/1988).
February: Hol.ick and Daniel sign papers to sell their homes to the city for $52,200. and
$64,000 respectively (Contract with the City of Ponca City, dated 2/29, 1988).
February: Holick sells his home to the city for $52,200; well above market value. His
neighbors insist they deserve equal treatment (Business Week, 6/27/1988).
March: Conoco submits new workplan for the assessment of groundwater and related
contamination in the Circle Drive area (OWRB record).
March: Governor Bellmon spent about three minutes visiting with a 13 member group
that paid a surprise visit to the state Capitol. A member of the group said the people
wanted to be evacuated while Conoeo tries to lower the ground water In the area. "Well
you are welcome to evacuate any time you like," Bellmon said. He told the group the
state did not have any money to reloeate the people (Ponca Cffy News, 311/1988).
March: "Many of the residents are scared and frustrated because they can't afford to pay
for their own evacuation, as Governor Bellman had suggested" (Ponca City News,
3/211988).
March: "An environmentalist says his group will push to have the residents of a Ponca
City neighborhood evacuated. The director of the National Campaign Against Toxic
Hazards said Ponca City will be the rallying cry for groups nationwide and vowed to push
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-for classifying the southeast neighborhood as a Superfund cleanup site" '(Jouma/-
Tribune, 3/4/1988).
March: "Ina poor neighborhood on Ponca City's south side retirees are wearing arm
bands and posting protest signs in their yards: "Enter at your own risk." "Ponca City is
Toxic City." "All houses guaranteed poisoned." "It is killing us; said 0119 of peTCC
members. 'We see people die and have miscarriages. There are extreme amounts of
cancer. All the politicians want to-do is make it an economics issue. It's not an economic
issue: It's a life and death issue" (Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 3/5/1988).
March: A leUer in the loeal paper from a citizen tells of the many wonderful things about
Ponca City and aUributes many of these to the Marland Oil Companyand Conoeo. The
writer stales he is a retired Conoeo worker. "They put bread on my table and there are
thousands like me that appreciate the many benefits." "In this time of economic trial for
our community, we had best act ina responsible manner, appreciating our many
blessings and discontinuing our efforts to kill the goose that laid the.golden egg" (Ponca
City News, 3/6/1988).
March: "A city buyout of two homes - the first step in Conoeo's Circle Drive cleanup plan
- has the support of a citizens group" (Ponca City News, 3/611988).
March: Oklahoma State Senator tours the Ponca City south side. "I would encourage
everyone to work with Conoeo and the city to solve this problem" (Ponca City News,
317/1'988).
March: U.S .Senator tours area at community residents' request. Senator writes to U.S.
EPA asking that they do air sampling of the area (Letter dated 3/15/1988).
March: Workmen start drilling on the first well for Conoeo and Ponca City's ground water
remediation plan to lower the water table under the Circle Drive area in south Ponca City.
The stUdy should be complete this summer and will be followed by the remedial program
already approved by the state (Ponca City News, 3/16/1988).
March: Vandals, foeusing on the south side, slashed dozens of car tires. Police first hear
of the tire slashings from PCTCC. Police said many of the tire slashings have occurred in
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-the parking lot where the concerned citizens hold weekly meetings every Tuesday night
(Ponca City News, 3/17/1988).
March: "State Health Department officials say a team from the U.S. EPA will be in town
next week to take air samples from homes in the contaminated Circle Drive area. A
private hydrologist, hired by the residents of the neighborhood said tests showed high
levels of dangerous chemicals. A hydrologist for Conoeo said the ground water contains
traces of hydrocarbons and isn't contaminated with dangerous levels of toxic chemicals."
"The state has said the area is not an i'mmediate health hazard" (Ponca City News,
3/20/1988).
March: A six-member committee was formed to work on the southside pollution problem.
The city attorney, city public safety director,' two members of the PCTCC group and two
representatives from Conoeo will meet "as needed." Communication between Conoeo,
the residents of south Ponca City and city officials has been a problem since widespread
concern was caused when polluted groundwater began seeping into neighborhood
basements (Ponca City News, 3/25/1988).
April: "Governor Bellmon announced the creation of the Hoover Creek Ad Hoe Steering
Committee to assist residents in an area of Ponca City that has been hit by hydroearbon-
laced water." The committee will be chaired by the Governor's Natural Resource
Secretary and will be composed of U.S. EPA, state and loeal government officials (Ponca
City News, 4/111988),
April: PCTCC proposed a buyout of homeowners who want to move at a minimum of
$50 sq. foot plus moving expense and compensation for alleged damage caused by
ground water pollution in the Circle Drive area (Ponca City News, 4/1/1988).
April: After Conoeo turned down last Thursday's complete buyout offer from pcrcc the
group met and proposed litigation against Conoeo, Ponca City's main employer (Ponca
City News, 4/6/1988).
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-April: A community-wide petition drive and a statement of concern from area legislatures
have provided moral support for Conoeo. A group of Ponca City area residents
organized to show support for Conoeo, Ponca City's largest employer.
Area legislatures issued the following statement: --"If this problem is going to be solved. it
is going to take the joint cooperation of Ponca City, Kay County, and the state of
Oklahoma" (Ponca City News, 4/811988).
April: About 2,000 red-shirted, sign waving residents gathered for a "Ponca Pride" rally
organized by Poncans for Progress, a group formed to counter negative publicity, and to
show support for Conoeo. The high school pep band played music as the crowd
gathered in downtown Ponca City. Television stations from across the state and the
Associated Press covered the event as supporters for Conoco attempted to show "Ponca
City is a good place to settle, to work, to play and to live" (Ponca City News, 412211988).
April: "Conoco repeated its long standing offer to provide and install free sump pumps to
residents and business persons in certain Ponca City neighborhoods who are
experiencing problems with seepage into their basements." Conoeo is conducting a
program on behalf of the city to lower the groundwater table in the area, using a system
of pumps and gravity drains. That plan has·been approved by state and federal agencies
(Ponca City News, 4/26/88).
April: A petition, with 8,000 signatures, supporting the efforts of the city and Conoeo to
clean up the Circle Drive area is submitted to Governor Henry Bellman (Ponca City
News, 4/26/88).
May: Two state health officials met with members of the PCTCC to answer questions
about recently released tests results of the groundwater in the Circle Drive area. They
stated the drinking water is safe (Ponca City News, 5/4/1988).
May: Twenty residents set up camp on the state Capitol grounds in an effort to get the
state to buyout and reloeate the Circle Drive residents in south side Ponca City,
Oklahoma (Ponca City News, 5/10/1988).
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-May: A small group of Ponca City residents interrupted Gavenor Bellman's news
conference today, calling him a 'murderer" and a "child abuser". The group wanted the
state to evacuate the residents of Circle Drive in Ponca City because of the groundwater
contamination (Ponca City News, 5/10/1988).
May: PCTCC members are told they can camp "indefinitely" on the state Capitol grounds
in Oklahoma City (The Daily Oklahoman 5/11/88).
May: Govemor Henry Bellmon paid a surprise visit this morning to Ponca City residents
camped on the Capitol lawn, and no one mentioned the pollution that brought the
campers to town (Ponca City News, 5/11/1988).
May: "A state Health Department report on the preliminary results of the U.S. EPA tests
of the groundwater and air in homes in the Circle Drive neighborhood shows no
immediate health haz.ard from the material" (Ponca City News, 6/1/1988).
May: Governor Bellmon writes a letter to the U.S. EPA Administrator asking if Superlund
assistance is available to residents of Ponca City ( Letter dated 5/12/1988).
May: Letter from U.S. EPA Regional Administrator states residents do not qualify for
Superlund relief because petroleum and petroleum fractions are excluded from the
Superlund (Letter to Governor Bellmon, 5/21/1988).
May: Ponca City residents camped on the capitol grounds say officials are harassing
them by making them move their tents and belongings every other day. 'We have to pick
them up and put them back down every other day. It's just a way to make us leave, but
were not leaving. We'll just move the tents" (The Daily Oklahoman, 5/22/1988).
According to the Oklahoma City Zoning Commission a hearing will be held Friday to
determine whether the tents should be allowed on the Capitol grounds (Ponca City News,
5/23/1988).
June: A final consent order has been approved by a federal judge in Oklahoma City that
allows Conoeo Inc. to pay a $250,000 fine for alleged clean air violations at its Ponca City
refinery in exchange for the payment, the U.S. EPA agreed not to prosecute Conoeo for
Clean Air Violations. The U.S. EPA alleges for 1975 and 1980 Conoeo burned fuel
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-higher in hydrogen sulfide than permitted by U.S. EPA standards. Conoeo did not deny
or admit it violated federal regulations (The Daily Oklahoman, 6/07/1988).
June: 'We have a problem but we don't have an emergency in Ponca City" stated the
State Fire Marshal (Ponca City News, 6/12/1988). . •
June: Ponca City Commissioner Gary Bower joined a member of the percc for a tour
around McKinley Park in the south side Circle Drive area Tuesday. After stomping on the
spongy ground a match was lit which caused small gas flares. The largest was a four-
inch flare that lasted for several seconds. Later the Ponca City Fire Chief returned,
stomped on the ground and produced a flame four inches high and 12 inches across the
ground before going out. The State Fire Marshall was contacted and was to make a
investigation later on in the week (Ponca City New, 6/15/1988).
June: Conoeo paid the cost of tearing Holicks' house down and in its place appeared a
sign stating "Circle Drive Groundwater Removal Program. A Ponca City Improvement
Projecf (Ponca City News, 6/18/1988).
June: "Their health is important but so is my job," stated a Conoeo employee and a
member of the Poncan's for Progress, a pro-Conoeo support group (Business Week,
6/27/1988).
June: Poncan's for Progress pass out bumper stickers and buttons with slogans
supporting Conoeo. "Many wear red T-shirts, paid for by Conoeo, which read: "Conoeo
is Ponca City's Best Neighbor.· Loeal businessman states he "would lose half of his
business if Conoeo closed their planf (Business Week, 6/27/1988).
July: Residents of Ponca City who have been camping on the state Capitol grounds
since May to protest pollution in their homes plan to hold a rally to draw public attention
back to their problem (Ponca City News, 7/17/1988).
July: "I could not believe there was a place in the United States where people lived with
levels of benzene this high." "There should be a fence placed around the entire south
part of this town to keep the people out... This place makes Love Canal look like a health
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-spa," stated the Westem Director of the National Toxic Campaign (Ponca City News, 7/
21/1988).
JUly: The PCTCC, a citizens group from Ponca City, that has been camped on the
capitol lawn for several months protesting the hydrocarbon contamination of their homes
states they will end the camp out and take their complaints elsewhere (Tulsa World,
7/21/1988.
July: A letter from the director of the state Office of Public Affairs Executive Office
requesting Ponca City Toxic Concerned Citizens to remove their signs and structures
from the capitol grounds received angry replies. We've been here since May 19 and they
issued us a permit to be here for an indefinite period and it's our constitutional right to
assemble and protest. They say now that we are in violation of zoning. How could it take,
them two months to decide we are in violation of the zoning? (Ponca City News, 7/
25/1988).
July: "I feel like we have been stabbed in the back" stated a PCTCC protester after being
ordered to dismantle their camp at the state capitol because of zoning violations (The
Daily Oklahoman, 7/25/88).
August: State officials say there has been no increase In cancer In Ponca City or Kay
County, despite a recent report from the group protesting polluted groundwater In south
Ponca City (Ponca City News, 8/5/1988).
September: 'We assist in linking up groups fighting similar problems and facing the
same difficulties ,in state and federal environmental standards. We unite grassroots
citizens groups that want more enforcement of state and federal laws. We are looking for
a stronger, more common sense approach to this national crisis," stated the director of
the Westem Director of National Toxic Campaign (Ponca City News, 9/29/1988).
November: Dr. Fredric E. Gerr, Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York, reviewed water
sample data obtained from a basement in the Circle Drive area noted the "potential for
serious health effects" from benzene alone and called for a reduction in exposure to a
substance considered dangerous at any level (The Washington Post, 1117//88).
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November: "You go to your foeal officials and they refuse to help you because they' are
afraid to get in a fight with Conoeo." "Your state officials won't help you because Canoco
pays into their campaign funds." "The U.S. EPA says we don't qualify." "It leaves you no
where to go," stated a PCTCC member (The Washington Post, ll(71188).
November: "The refinery manager for Canoeo states we do not have a pollution problem
in Ponca City. The oily odors probably result from "swamp gas" not petroleum wastes
and the ground water pollution are from "unknown sources." Nevertheless Conoco acting
as a "good neighbor" has agreed to lower the water table to reduce the threat of flooding"
(The Washington Post, 11/7/1988).
December: By the end of the year several more homes were abandoned by their owners
without compensation, the house at 200 Lucas, the one across the street and the house
at 444 Lawrence (Interview with former Circle Drive resident).
1989 February: The City of Ponca City IConoco, Inc. filed a petition with the Oklahoma Water
Resources Board for an application to discharge treated ground water which has been
produced during aquifer remediation into the Arkansas River (Legal Notice Published in
Ponca City News, 6/1/1989).
April: PCTCC protesters receive city citations for having protest signs in their yards. The
signs offer free tours of their "toxic" homes. They claim their homes are contaminated
with hydrocarbon sludge and seepage (The Open Spaces, 4/1989).
April: Ponca City residents upset with foul smelling and possible toxic chemicals oozing
into their basements flied a civil lawsuit in federal court to prevent city officials from
removing protest signs from their yard. Protesters say the city is violating their First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech. City officials have threatened the protesters
with fines of $200 per sign if they are not removed (Stillwater News Press, 4/25/1989).
May: A group of Circle Drive area residents filed a class action suit May 17, 1989, in
federal district court, against Conoeo claiming damages from groundwater that in some
cases entered the basements of their homes (Ponca City News, 5/211990).
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-May: Co-chairman of the PCTCC pointed out in a meeting Tuesday ,night "no one has
sat down and talked to us one-to--one. That's all we ,ask" {Ponca City News, 5/4/1989).
July: Opposition from loeal and state groups against Conoeo's application for grol,lnd
water removal has developed (Ponca City News, 7/17/1989)
October: Greenpeace and National Toxic Campaign toured Ponca City to show support
for loeal environmental groups. Conoeo refinery manager states ·Conoeo realizes there
is a ground water problem and is well on its way to solving the problem. That solutionis
the city of Ponca City and Conoeo ground water lowering plan that has been approved by
the Oklahoma Water Resource Board" "In light of this progress, we are disheartened that
a few loeal residents, with the encouragement of outside activist groups, continue to
foeus on the problem with no desire to be part of the solution. As for any concerns for
health effects, we remind these people that the Oklahoma Department of Health states
there is no health threat to the South Ponca City residents" (Ponca City News,
10/18/1989).
October: Efforts to lower the groundwater in the Circle Drive area to begin soon (Ponca
City News, 10/23/1989).
November: In a letter pUbl'ished in the Ponca City News a member of PCTCC said "This
pseudo-solution (ground water remediabon plan) is the cheapest out-of-sight-out-of-mind
attempt to quiet down, not solve, the problem." The writer questioned if the city would be
responsible for any violations of the NPDES permit. The writer notes that the-citlzens had
no part in the solution suggested (Ponca City News, 11/13/1989).
November: The U.S. EPA conducts a ground water public hearing. Conoeo refinery
manager states "the U.S. EPA has before it a plan to help the high groundwater problem
that has been jointly developed by Conoeo and Ponca City and approved by the city
commission and the Oklahoma Water Resources Board. It is up to the U.S. EPA to
determine whether or not to approve a portion of that plan. That part of the plan involves
the discharging of treated groundwater into the Arkansas River" (Ponca City News,
11/14/1989).
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-November: A public hearing was held by the U.S. EPA in Ponca City to discuss the
ground water remediation plan offered jointly by Conoeo and Ponca City officials to
discharge treated contaminated ground water Into the Arkansas River. Most of the 250
people that attended the meeting either worked for Canoeo or supported the company's
plan. Many in the crowd wore red, the company color, or red t-shirts that said: "Conoeo--
Ponca City's Best Neighbor."
Residents of the south-side Circle Drive area asked U.S. EPA officials to deny the plan
over concerns the water contains toxic chemicals that would threaten fish and wildlife
(The Daily Oklahoman, 11/16/1989).
December: U.S. EPA approves the permit for Canoeo's plan to lower the ground water
by pumping (Ponca City News, 12/24/1989).
1990 April: "Six month's of negotiations came to an end Monday with the announcement of a
multi-million dollar settlement agreement between Conoeo and a group of Circle Drive
residents over the on-going groundwater situation in south Ponca City. Conoeo said
today it is ottering to buy nearly 400 houses and residential lots alongside its refinery
here as part of the proposed lawsuit settlement. A federal judge in Oklahoma City must
approve the plan before it can take effect. A hearing will be held on June 5" (Poncs City
News, 4/2/1990).
April: The Conoeo refinery manager stated, "The settlement can mark the beginning of
the end of a situation that has fueled a public controversy pitting neighbor against
neighbor and friend against friend for too long" (Ponca City News, 4/2/1990).
April: A full pag.e notice in lOOay's Ponca City News, signed by the refinery manager said
in addition to the purchase of homes and properties, a $5 million settlement fund would
be established "to be divided under certain established formulas among people who have
lived in property within the area since 1966 that is roughly bordered by South Avenue,
Highway n, Highway 60 and the refinery's eastern border" (Ponca City News, 4/2/1990).
April: A summary notice was published concerning proposed settlement between
Conoco and the Circle Drive residents (Ponca City News, 4/6/1990).
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April: 'VoJe did the right thing," Conoeo President Constant "Dina" Nicandros said about
the proposed buyout of south side Circle Drive residents. Nicandros said 'We aU feel
very strongly about Ponca City and to have this kind of thing dividing the people, making
the national news in a very negative way wasn't good." He said he had not had negative
reactions from within the industry, but some of the Conoeo employees felt the company
should "fight back." The proposed settlement is based on a no-fault agreement.
Nicandros said "as long as the issue was around, and it is still around, it would have been
difficult to position the company where it wanted to be in regard to the environmenr
(Ponca Cft}' News, 4/10/1990).
April: Approximately two weeks after a tentative settlement was reached with Conoeo
nearly 300 of the possible 400 homeowners had agreed to accept the Conoeo buyout
offer of a $23 million settlement (Ponca Cft}' News, 4/10/1990).
April: Groundwork was laid Thursday for the Southside Alliance, a self-help organization
for those who will be liVing in the Conoeo settlement areas south of South Avenue after
the buyout is completed. Although set in motion by Conoeo, the Southside Alliance is
intended to be an organization of residents of the area which will give them a vehicle to
improve property values, give input about Conoeo's green belt development, and help
solve other problems common to the area (Ponca City News, 4/20/1990).
May: "Loeal banks announce low interest loans for residents not included in the Conoeo
purchase area,. but still within the class action lawsuit" (Ponca City News, 5n/1990).
May: The class-action settlement is the subject of a meeting Tuesday at the East Junior
High school. Attorney for the class action members and attorney for Conoeo will address
questions regarding the interpretation of the proposed class-action settlement agreement
(Ponca Cft}' News, 5/20/90).
May: "More than 6,000 Ponca City residents filed claims, seeking to be included in
Conoeo's proposed $23 million settlement of a dispute over allegedly tainted ground
water" (Ponca City News, 5/25190).
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June: A splinter group of Circle Drive residents objected in federal court to Conoeo's
buyout offer stating the buyout area was not expansive enough. The group objected to
the requirement that anyone bought out or accepting buyout terms must move completely
out of the affected area, and thirdly, argued that families accepting the terms might be
"compromising the future health and welfare of their children" (Ponca Cffy News,
6/6/1990).
JUly: "After three years of controversy, accusations and negotiations, the end is in sight
for the ongoing groundwater pollution situation in south Ponca City."
"Tuesday Federal District JUdge Ralph Thompson approved the settlement agreement
between Conoeo and the plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit, paving the way for the
possible buyout of some 400 properti.es in the Circle Drive area" (Ponca City News,
7/4/1990).
JUly: '" think this is a great day for the people of Ponca City and a great day for all
environmentalists. All the people involved, including our clients, are in hopes that this will
set an industry standard and that refineries will begin creating green belts to protect
citizens residing near their instal'lations," stated the plaintiffs attorney.
JUdge Thompson's order says that of the 8,000 residents represented by the lawsuit, only
79 opted out of the settlement and only eight filed formal objections to the settlement
(Ponca Cffy News, 7/4/1990).
September: Representatives of OWRB met with officials from the city of Ponca City and
Conoeo recently to review the progress and operation of the ground water management
program in the Circle Drive area (Ponca City News, 9/11/90).
Conclusion
After the Conoeo buyout of Circle Drive was completed and the homes of those who
chose to leave were removed, one business building (used tor storage), an abandoned school
building, a church and six homes were still in the area. The homes that remained were on high
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ground and had not received actual groundwater contamination. The area is now a greenbelt for
the Conoeo refinery.
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CHAPTER III
SITING CONTROVERSIES AND POLICY GRIDLOCK
Introduction
This chapter reviews the topics related to conflict resolution between citizens groups,
industry and government conceming siting issues. A major problem facing the nation is the
inability of the government to site undesirable facilities and the citizen's backlash that has
developed from these attempts.
A Closer Look at the Problem
Many people lack trust in the ability or desire of the government (federal, state and local)
to protect them from harm. They believe the government is unwilling or unable to enforce
environmental and health standards (Morell and Magorlan 1982). They believe the government is
often "in bed with industry" and the citizen's rights will be the last to be protected (interview with
environmental activist). Many that do believe the government attempts to help citizens often feel
the laws protect industry and hamper the efforts of the government to protect citizens from major
long-term risks (Bacow and Milkey 1982).
Collins et al. (1985} describe why institutions are distrusted: government is distrusted due
to its past failures to protect citizens from threats to human health, safety, welfare, and the
environment. Business and industry are distrusted because of their legacy of irresponsibility,
absence of care, and liability shifting. Scientific and technical expertise is distrusted because of
contradictions, discrepancies, and disagreements in analysis of risks and impacts.
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Fishhoff, Siovic and Lichtenstein (1983), Lawler and Focht (1989), and Lawler, Focht,
and Hatley (1994) provide evidence that govemment agencies share a technical orientation with
industry in permit/remedial decisions. Wynn (1992) and Trauth (1994) found that citizens often
believe that siting procedures are biased in favor of the developer. Distrust, as.Kraft and Clary
(1991 :322) argue, is what "fuels emotion, which heightens fear of the perceived risks."
Trust is often considered a precondition for negotiations, especially on environmental
issues. Focht (1995) points out that the belief that trust makes good agreements possible,
though widespread, is not shared by all. Some argue instead that one should think of trust as a
product of successful negotiation rather than as a necessary precondition. People and countries
negotiate with those they do not trust, even enemies, though they do so carefully, with due
attention to verification and enforcement. Agreements worked out between these distrustful
parties contain provisions to satisfy each side that the other side will comply with the terms of the
agreement. If these arrangements work, the parties may gradually develop mutual trust
(Schmeidler and Sandman 1988; Focht 1995).
Schmeidler and Sandaman (1988) state the point that people have to stop asking each
other for trust and start making sure every side is at the table protecting its own interests.
Even those who downplay the importance of· trust in negotiations acknowledge that a
minimal level of trust is needed. If one doesn't believe that the other party will be consistent in
what It says or does, negotiating will be nearly impossible (Schmeidler and Sandman 1988).
The disagreement among experts over acceptable exposure levels to toxic substances
further undermines social trust (Kimsky and Golding 1992). I,f the experts cannot agree, how can
citizens have confidence in their decisions?
Experts define risk in a narrow technical way, whereas the public has a richer, more
complex view that incorporates value-based considerations such as equality, controllability, and
catastrophic potential (Krimsky and Golding' 1992). How people perceive adverse impacts has
been shown to be a motivating factor in NIMBY opposition (Poutney 1991).
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Another basis of citizen's distrust is that most citizens perceive risks in terms of
consequences while experts emphasize probabilities, (Kimsky and Golding 1992). Lowrance
(1980:6) defines risks as the mathematical product of the probability and severity of the
consequences of exposure to a toxicant. Thomas (1981 :27) defines risk perception as Uan
idiosyncratic process of interpretation. which involves a subjective probabUity judgment about the
occurrence of an unpleasant event. or an interpretation by the individual that reflects how he or
she defines and feels about the outcome." While experts may weigh risk probabilities as well as
consequences. Rubin (1986) found that laypersons were primarily concerned only wilth
consequences.
Decision Making Criteria
Edelstein (1988) states the criteria by which decisions are made do not reflect social
values expressed through the political process. but rather political decisions hidden behind the
rational of technical standards made by experts. Thus, the question of acceptable risk has little to
do with people's values, but much to do with the economic and political forces concerned with the
costs of environmental standards. Adams (1993) comments that the continued focus on
objective, rational considerations in environmental decision-making, and the continued inattention
to subjective, non-technical considerations, has resulted in an increasing deterioration of trust on
the part of citizens toward decision-makers.
Loss of Control Theory
The inability of a community to stop a threat affects people's sense of well being.
Threatening events can shatter people's basic assumption about the world, giving way to new
perceptions marked by threat, danger, insecurity. and self-questioning (Edelstein 1988).
Edelstein (1988:181) adds that people may experience 'eelings of depression and a sense of
being helpless and disabled." These feelings and perceptions lead people to get involved in
order to maintain a sense of control over the force affecting their lives (Bachrach and Zautra
1985). Empirical evidence supports the loss of control theory. Edelstein (1988) found in his case
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study of Legler, a contaminated community in Jackson, New Jersey, that loss of control was a
dominant theme for residents.
Citizen Power
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, citizens came to realize by forming citizens groups
and banding together, they had the power to delay and often stop the siting of unwanted facilities.
Resistance to siting by citizens groups is considered by many to be one of the most significant
obstacles to facility siting (Duffy 1984; Mitchell and Carson 1986; Lake 1987; Focht 1995). Those
opposing a facility have a strong aversion to living next to the kind of facility being proposed and
are predisposed to reject it (Armour 1991; Focht 1995).
Community Concerns
Studies such as those by Armour (1991) and Duberg, Frankel, and Niemeczewski (1980) have
shown that community resistance to siting proposals is linked to four important concems. These
include inequities in the distribution of costs and benefits, perceived risks, feeling of loss of
control over forces affecting the quality of one's life and community, and lack of trust in
proponents and regulators.
Communities are affected even when the rumor of an unwanted facility is unleashed.
Community lifestyle is disrupted and trust begins to erode even before the proposed facility is a
reality.
Costs to the CommunitY
Morell and Mogarian (1982) have identified four types of local costs that are the basis for
public objections to proposed hazardous waste facilities: health and safety risks; nuisance costs
and "quality of life" concerns; property value and other monetary losses; and increased need for
community services (depletion of community budget). In contrast to the costs, the benefits are
rather limited, for example, increased tax revenues and the creation of a few (often low paying)
jobs.
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Bridging the Gap
The solution to the problem of citizen opposition to unknown risk involves bridging the
gap between technocracy and democracy, between objective facts and subjective values,
between scientific risk assessments and lay risk judgments, between conflict and cooperation
(Focht 1995). Hill (1992) found the next logical question would be, how do politicallnstitutlons
close the gap between those who have the most complete understanding of the means - the
technical experts - and those who are the final arbiters of value - ordinary citizens? Bord and
O'Connor (1992) and Focht (1995) found that scientific risk assessments and technical decision
criteria are distrusted because they effectively isolate the public from effective participation in the
decision process.
Several excellent ethnographic studies on the sociological and psychological impacts on
citizens who have been exposed to threats from hazardous substances!n their communities have
been reported as early as 1969 by Barton, Levine (1982), Edelstein (1988), and Couch and Kroll-
Smith (1985). In addition the social science literature includes several studies of the subjective
aspects of risk perception and risk management (Slovic and Fischoff 1984; Wildavsky 1990;
Slovic 1986). Results of these studies show two important components of successful public
acceptance of risk: the provision of a meaningful opportunity for public input into the risk
management process, especially with respect to defining acceptable risk, and the provision of
substantive public participation in decision making.
Community expressions of NIMBY indicate that the sole reliance upon objective criteria to
choose among alternatives in natural resources or risk management otten fails to obtain public
acceptance. It can be argued that attempts to effectively exclude public participation in decision
making will also fail to lead to public acceptance (Focht, Lawler, and Noltensmeyer 1988; Lawler,
Focht and Dickson 1989; Focht 1995).
Solutions
Solutions to these issues must incorporate factors such as openness, communication,
and empowerment (Edelstein 1988). Solutions must include strategies for direct and substantive
citizen participation in the decision making process (Focht 1995).
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The idea of including factors other than those involving technical and scientific issues in
environmental decision-making processes is not new. A panel reviewing health studies
conducted by the New York Department of Health scientists for the controversial Love Canal
cleanup, expressed the opinion that, "the state (of New York) may also wish to include non-
scientists, local residents, and others in future deliberations" (Levine 1982). However, Adams
(1993) noted that the prevalence of NIMBY and TIMBY conflicts today indicates that even though
these approaches were promoted in one of the earliest of the United States remediation
controversies, the lessons were not learned.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
Multiple methodologies, both qualitative and quantitative, and subjective and objective in
nature, are being IJsed in this case study to address validity challenges that are common in the
social sciences.
Initial Survey Design and Pretest
The survey instrument used in the research was initially developed by members of the
research team and pre-tested on a group of citizen activists from a "brownfield" community. Two
versions of the pretest were given to the "brownfield" activists, a total of 16 respondents. The
pretest questionnaire was composed of four parts and was administered in a group setting. The
responses obtained from the pretest survey indicated the need to administer the survey in a
personal interview, rather than a group setting,. in order to ensure that the respondents clearly
understood the questions or the task.
The pretest results were analyzed qualitatively to determine whether the questions were
unambiguous, and whether the responses were consistent. The final survey instruments were
developed to overcome the problems found in the pretest version.
The instruments were made flexible enough that they could be used in different types of
controversies and still give constant data for comparison purposes.
Design
A multi-instrument survey was used in this research project. The survey consisted of 1. a
structured questionnaire with an open-ended personal interview, 2. a methodology, and 3. two
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card sorting ranking exercises. The three methods combine to create triangulation in the
research design.
Stakeholder Sampling
Only stakeholders that were knowledgeable about the controversy were selected to
participate in the survey. A total of 22 stakeholders, including loeal citizen activists, Conoeo
officials, state employees, an attorney, and other citizens of the community were included.
Archival research and information gathering interviews were conducted to obtain an
understanding of the history of Ponca City and the South-side Circle Drive Controversy. Library
records, interviews with Ponca City Toxic Concerned Citizens (PCTCC) and Ponca City Conoeo
personnel. newspaper clippings, articles from national magazines. U.S. EPA reports, Oklahoma
Water Resource Board reports, Oklahoma State Health Department records, personal and
professional letters, and previous scholarly papers written on the Ponca City controversy provided
a historical background for the events surrounding the controversy.
Interviews with citizens involved in the controversy and archival research provided names
for further interviews and sources of information.
Instruments
Structured Questionnaire
The survey instruments were revised and adapted to address the multiple important
issues in the Ponca City Circle Drive controversy. The structured questionnaire was administered
as two parts: closed and open-ended questions.
Closed-Ended Interview
The questionnaire administered at the beginning of the interview consisted of 11
questions concerning the situation that existed in south Ponca City from late 1986 until late 1990
regarding the contamination of the Circle Drive area alleged to have been caused by the Conoeo
refinery. The questions were multiple choice or closed-ended questions that sought to identify
the extent to which the respondents were involved in the Ponca City controversy, their
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relationships with the various groups involved in the situation, and the sources from Which they
received their information about the controversy. This information was also used to interpret the
a factors and is discussed in the results in 'Chapter 8. Each participant was given a copy of the
initial questionnaire and asked to complete it.
The last section of the closed-ended interview consisted of eight questions regarding
demographic characteristics of the participant. This questionnaire addressed customary
demographic data such as age, gender, education level, and primary occupation, as well as, how
close the respondent lived to the controversial site, and whether or not the participant was a
member of any citizen's groups or service organizations (see Appendix A).
Open-Ended Interview
The second section of the survey consisted of open-ended questions designed to elicit
I
elaborated answers (see Appendix B). The citizen's interview consisted of 23 questions
concerning the individual's role in the controversy, reasons for getting involved in the situation,
concerns about the cleanup of the area, changes in attitude and business climate since the
buyout, what went wrong and what went right, and how the situation could have been handled
better. A similar but separate list of questions was given to Conoeo and government officials
(See Appendix B). Due to the length of the responses, all open-ended interviews were recorded
and eventually transcribed.
Analysis of the open-ended interview facilitated interpretation of the a sort and rank order
card sorts. The open-ended ,interview allowed participants tree expression of their views.
Participants were encouraged to express their feelings and concerns honestly and to clarify any
potential misinterpretation.
Q Methodology
Q technique and its methodology, invented and advanced primarily by William
Stephenson (1953), was designed to assist in the orderly examination of human SUbjectivity.
Although the a sort technique and associated statistical methods have been employed primarily
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in psychology, they are also of great importance to political theory in both norm.ative and empirical
respects.
William Stephenson, in his forward to Steven B. Brown's book Pofitica( Subjectivity(1980,
6), states:
Simply stated, Q technique is a set of procedures whereby a sample of objects is
placed in a significant order with respect to a single person. In its most typical form, the
sample involves statements of opinion (0 sample) that an individual rank.-orders in
terms of some condition of instruction; e.g., from "most agree" (+5) to "most disagree"
(-5). The items so arrayed comprise what is called a Q sort. 0 sorts obtained from
several persons are normally correlated and factor-analyzed by any of the available
statistical methods. Factors indicate clusters ot persons who have ranked the
statements in essentially the same fashion. Explanation of factors is advanced in terms
of commonly shared attitudes or perspectives. Q methodology is the body of theory
and principles that guides the application of technique, method, and explanation...
All factors are subjective, yet grounded in concrete behavior, are usually reliable and
easily replicated, and are subject to statistical summary, which facilitates more careful
description and comparison.
o Sort Technique
The 0 technique is a set of procedures where a sample of statements about a subject is
placed in a significant order by a single person. The 0 sample consisted of forty-seven
statements derived by the research team from comments. discussions, and opinions about
various environmental activists and groups (see Appendix E). The 0 sample involved statements
of opinions, recollections, or reactions to other stimuli relating to the topic under stUdy. The
participants were asked to spread the cards out, reread the statements, and place each
statement on the form board (see Appendix E), accoliding to their beliefs from Most Agree (+5) to
Least Agree (-5) working from the ends toward the middle. The form board was constructed as a
pyramid of 47 rectangles arranged in a quasi-normal distribution (eleven plies with frequencies of
2, 3, 4. 5, 6. 7, 6. 5. 4, 3, 2) (See Appendix E).
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Q items were placed on the form board as constructed. forcing participants to identify the
few statements about which they felt most strongly and which therefore played the greatest role
later in the analysis. Each participant was free to rearrange any statement on the form board at
any time, and was encouraged to examine the arrangement when finished to make sure it
reflected hislher beliefs. Each statement's unique number was recorded on a score sheet by the
researcher.
The Q sort configurations were factor-analyzed at Oklahoma State University using PC
QUANAL, a statistical factor analysis program specifically designed for Q methodology (Van
Tubergen 1975). PC QUANAL correlates the a sorts and the correlation coefficient matrix is
factor analyzed using the principal components method and orthogonal varimax rotation to reveal
commonly shared perspectives, opinions, values or attitudes. PC QUANAL outputs factor score
arrays for the common factors retained following rotation. Aher analysis, the researcher attempts
to interpret each common factor based on the factor score arrays and on other relevant
information, including prior interviews. These interpretations are then reinterpreted by
interviewing again the person whose a-sorts have the highest and purest load(s) on each factor.
The highest load is the sort that correlates most highly with the common factor. The pure loader
is the sort that represents a common or shared perspective by loading most "cleanly" on a
common factor. In some cases, the highest and the purest loads might be the a-sort completed
by the same person.
a methodology results are discussed in Chapter 7.
Rank-Order Card Sort
Following the Q sort exercise, two rank order card sorting tasks were given to the
participants. The first card sort task involved a set of thirteen cards (see Appendix C) on which
were described decision criteria typically used by policy makers when proposing construction of
hazardous waste management facilities and clean-up of environmental contamination. Aher the
cards were shuffled and placed in no particular order, the respondents were asked to read
through the cards, ranking them from "most to leasr important, in order to reveal their beliefs
about which criteria should be most important in making environmental decisions. Aher ranking
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-them ordinally, the respondents were asked to group the cards in groups such as "highly
important," "somewhat important," and "not important," to indicate the relative importance of each
card to the others.
The second set of rank order cards consisted of nine different citizen participation
strategies that varied in the extent to which citizens can provide input to the decision process and
their power to influence decisions (see Appendix D). This sort was intended to determine the
decision process that participants believed was best suited to averting decision gridlock.
After the cards were shuffled, the participants read through them, ranking them in the
order of preference, and grouping them according to "highly preferred," "somewhat preferred,"
and "not preferred," strategies.
The frequency distributions were calculated for each of the items on the cards, for both
decision factor cards (sort #1), and public participation strategy cards (sort #2). Additionally, Q
methodology was used to interpret the rankings given to the items in the card sorts through the
use of factor analysis. The data obtained through these analyses are compared to responses
given in the in-depth interview questions and to the results of Q sorts completed by participants.
The differences and similarities between responses, and preferences of the group as a whole and
individually are also evaluated and discussed in Chapter 8.
Procedures for Administering the Interview
Participants were allowed to choose the place for the interview; most chose their residence.
The interview began with the presentation of research credentials, brief introductions, and a
complete explanation of the study. All the participant's questions were ans~ered. Participants
were than asked to sign a consent form confirming that their participation was VOluntary, that
interview results would be held in strict confidence, and that the participants would remain
anonymous to anyone outside the research team. The survey was presented in the following
order: initial and final questionnaires, open-ended interview, Q sort, and rank-ordered card sort.
Before administering each instrument, participants were informed of its purpose and given
appropriate instruction. In addition, participants were invited to take breaks and informed that
they could terminate the interview at any time. At the conclusion of the interview, participants
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were thanked for their participation, and given a proposed date for completion of the research
report.
Methodological Considerations
There are several potential limitations with the approach and methods used in this case
study. Because this research did not take place during the time the controversy actually
occurred, reliance on second-hand, archival, and verbal information is necessary in order to
understand the historical and contextual atmosphere surrounding the controversy. The objectivity
of sources used to obtain this type of informati.on must be evaluated.
The selection of interview subjects depended to some degree on their availability, both
physically and temporally. Some individuals had moved away from the community, and some
had tired of the subject and refused to participate in the study.
Another concern is the ability of individuals interviewed to accurately recollect their
experiences, thoughts, and feelings as they existed at the tlime of their involvement with the
situation. Several questions in the open- and close-ended interview sections ask respondents to
remember the original reasons they got involved, how they felt about a certain situation, etc. This
task is frequently difficult for the respondent to do in light of what they may have learned about
the situation or the issues involved since that time. Strategic bias can also enter into answers to
questions when the individual wishes to give what he/she perceives to be the "correcr answer to
interview questions.
Due to the length of the entire interview process (an average of 1Y2 hours), respondents
sometimes felt tired by the end of the interview when the card sorts were presented. This
situation, possibly combined with distractions occurring at the interview location, could result in
inaccuracies in card sorts. A lack of understanding of terms and/or concepts used in the
descriptions of the decision factors and participabon strategies can also act to impede accurate
data collection.
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QUESTIONNAIRE AND INTERVIEW RESULT5
Results of the Questionnaires
Twenty-two stakeholders participated in this case study. Fourteen were citizens involved
in the controversy supporting the Cfrcle Drive residents. One citizen was not involved with the
controversy in any way and was considered a control subject. Four government people were
involved, with three being neutral and the fourth supporting the citizens' group. Three industry
people were interviewed, with two being against the citizens group and one being neutral.
TABLE 1
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPANTS
Support
*Stlke- Proximity Frequency for
holder to Site of Civic Sex Age EducatJon Occu.,.tlon Re.lden"Plrtlclpatlon of
Circle Dr.
PC-1 1 block Frequently Female 62 High BuslneS$ Yes
SChool Owner
PC-2 1 mile Frequently Male 35 High Business Yes
School Owner
PC-3 Y2 block Never Female 60 Business Insurance Yes
Colleae
PC·4 2 blocks Never Female >60 Business Business Yes
College Owner
PC-5 ~ block Never Female 50 Jr. College Business Yes
Owner
PC-6 2Y2 blocks Never Male 75 llUl arade Civil Service Yes
PC-? ~ block Seldom Female 65 High Business Yes
SChool Owner
PC-B 3 blocks Never Male 66 College Business Yes
Owner
PC-9 1 block Never Female 35 1 sam. Secretary Yes
Colleae
PC-l0 3 blocks Never Female 68 High Day Care Yes
SChool Director
PC-It Y2 block Never Male 40 High Carpenter Yes
School
PC-12 3 blocks Never Female 40 8Ul arade Waitress Yes
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'Stakeholder Identification: G = Govemment; I = Industry; C = CItizen
Data abstracted from the final questionnaire demonstrated that all participants ,in this
Table 2 below summarizes the data from the ,initial questionnaire. This questionnaire
the Circle Drive residents lived from one-fourth block to three blocks from the refinery. Since
study, except for the government participants, lived four miles or less from the refinery. Most of
general population, only lived approximately four miles from the site of the contamination. One
government official lived approximately thirteen miles; the other two lived at least one hundred
Ponca City is a rather small town, even the industry participants, who lived farther away than the
miles from the refinery.
Support
-Stake- Proximity Frequency for
holder to Site of Civic Sex Age Education Occupation ResidentsParticipation of
Circle Dr.
PC-13 G4 NA Unknown Male >50 College Director
State Health Neutral
Dept.
PC-14 G3 NA Unknown Female 50 College Hydro- Neutral
aeoloaist
PC-15 G1 NA Unknown Male >40 College Water
Resource Neutral
Board
PC-1611 4 miles Frequently Male 50 Chemist Refinery No
MBA Manaaer
PC-17 3 miles Frequently Female 55 College Museum Neutral
Curator
PC-18 G2 13 miles Freauentlv Male 56 CoHeQe Senator Yes
PC·1912 3 miles Frequently Male >40 Masters Industry No
dearee Enviro Reo
PC-20 13 3 miles Frequently Female >40 College Industry Neutral
Secretary
PC-21 3 miles Frequently Male 40 Masters Teacher Yes
dearee
PC-22 4 miles Frequently Male 50 Law degree Attomev Yes
..
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sought to identify the information sources upon which respondents relied concerning the
groundwater contamination in the community of Circle Drive near the Ponca City Conoeo refinery
and which of these sources they most trusted and distrusted. The questionnaire also inqUired
about the type and extent of public participation which respondents engaged in during the
contamination controversy.
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TABLE 2
RELATIONSHIP AND ROLES OF PARTICIPANTS
)
Stake- Sources ot Into. Most Most
Holder About Trosted Dlstrosted Public Relationship to
Controversy Source Source Participation Activist Group
PC1 Enviro. Groups Enviro. Conoeo Organize Member &
Friends, Groups, City meetings spokes-person
neighbors, Own Govern. Testified govt.. PCTCC
Living in area research meeting
Spoke at rallies
Contacted govt..
Camoed capitol
PC2 Enviro. Groups Own info. Poncans Organized Member &
Friends, neighbors Obtained for meetings spokes-person
U.S. EPA From Progress, Testified govt.. PCTCC
U.S. Justice OSDH, Conoeo meet.
Depart. U.S. EPA City govt.. Spoke at rallies,
Contacted govt..
Lead tours
PC3 Friends! neighbors Friends & Conoeo Organized Member &
Self/resident Neighbors, City govt. meetings spokes-person
Out of town Media Out of town Testified govt. PCTCC
Living in area media, own I meet.
information Spoke at rallies,
Contacted govt..
Lead tours
PC4 Nat'l news media, Enviro. OSDH, Participated in Member
Friends/neighbors, Groups, City govt., Rallies, contacted PCTCC, steering
PCTCC,NTC Nat'l news Conoeo Gov., spoke commiMe
liVing in area Media meetings, PCTCC
camped capitol
PCS Nat'l newslTV PCTCC, Conoeo, Contacted govt.. Member
PCTCC, NTC, NTC U.S. EPA, Attended/spoke PCTCC, steering
Individuals in U.S. OSDH, Meetings, capitol committee
EPA City QOvt.. meetina PCTCC
PC6 PCTCC,NTC PCTCC, Conoeo, Contacted govt.. Member &
NTC, U.S. EPA, Attended/spoke steering
Friends, OSDH meetings committee
NeiQhbors PCTCC
PC? PCTCC,NTC PCTCC, Conoeo, Attended PCTCC Member PCTCC
Friends/neighbors NTC U.S. EPA, Meetings
Fellow workers OSDH
TV
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Stake- Sources of Info. Most Most ,
Holder About Trusted Distrusted Public Relationship to
Controversy Source Source Participation Activist GrouD
PC8 Nat'l News, radio, Nat'l TV Conoco, Contacted govt Member PCTCC
Nat'l TV, PCTCC, City govt.. Official, spoke/
PCTCC,NTC NTC Local news attended meetings
Friends/neighbors Media
PC9 News media PCTCC Conoco, Signed petition Member PCTCC
Friends/neighbors News U.S. EPA Attended pcrcc
PCTCC, U.S. EPA Friends NTC meetings, helped
OK S Health Dept. organize meetings
PC10 Enviro. Groups Enviro. Conoco, Attended/spoke Member PCTCC
Friends/neighbors Groups , City govt.. Meetings,
Local News Contacted govt.
media camped capitol
PC11 Nat'l news media, U.S. EPA, Conoco, . Petition, attended! Member PCTCC
Friends/neighbors, : Nat'l news, Local news spoke meetings,
PCTCC, NTC, Friends/ camped capitol
U.S. EPA, Neighbors
PC12 Nat'l news media, pcrcc, Conoco, Attended/spoke Member PCTCC
PCTCC,NTC NTC U.S. EPA, Local/govt.
State govt. meetings, camped
capitol
I PC13 Government, Conoco, Enviro. NA None
G4 Conoco oovt. Groups I
PC14 Government, Conoco, No None None
G3 Conoco Gov. comment
PC15 Government, Conoco, Enviro. None None
G1 Conoco Gov. Groups
PC16 Conoco, Conoco, Enviro Attended None
In 1 Government State gov. Groups State/Conoco
Meetings
PC17 Local and Nat'l Local and No None None
News Nat'l news comment
PC18 Local and Nat'l LocaVNat'1 No Was not actively None
G2 News,OSDH news, comment involved I
Friends/neighbors OSDH
PC19 Conoco Conoco Enviro. Was not involved None
In 2 Groups
PC20 Conoco, rnedia, Conoco, No None None
In 3 Friends/neiohbors Gov. Comment
PC 21 Friends/neighbors PCTCC, Conoco, Organized/attended Member
Own research, NTC City govt. / PCTCC, steering
Enviro. Groups U.S. EPA Spoke Meetings, committee
contacted govt.
PC 22 Attorney Own No Attorney for a small None
research Comrnent group not involved
in class action suit
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-Conoeo
Most industry participants obtained information about the controversy from official
sources: Conoeo, the state and U.S. EPA; one listed friends, neighbors and news media. This
can be explained by their employment-all worked for Conoeo.
With respect to trust, industry participants again relied on the official sources. Most
industry participants distrusted the information provided by the environmental and Circle Drive
(PCTCC) activist groups because they believed it to be biased and uninformed.
The consensus opinion among industry participants was that the Circle Drive (PCTCC)
activists were ignorant, or misinformed and driven by greed.
Citizens
Circle Drive activists (PCTCC) obtained information about the controversy from the news
media, friends, public hearings, the state, the U.S. EPA, and environmental groups. Their most
trusted information came from environmental groups, friends, and out-of-town news media.
Within the loeal activist group (PCTCC) were individuals with advanced degrees and knowledge
in the area in question. The least trusted information came from ConoeD, the loeal news media,
and loeal civic government. As their disillusion grew, the Circle Drive group (PCTCC) came to
distrust the OSDH and the U.S. EPA also.
Government
The government officials depended heavily on the information from Conoco, the U.S.
EPA and their own information. They did not trust the information from the environmental groups
or the PCTCC. They considered the news media biased because the media focused on the
controversy rather than the science of the project.
Government participation was limited to professional practice and public hearings.
Results at the Personal Interviews
Citizens wanted relief from the contamination in their homes and community. They were
concerned with the short-and long-term health effects. Because many of the citizens had close
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ties with Conoeo and even more so because of E. W. Marland's parental attitude toward the
citizens of the town in previous years, they expected Conoeo to remedy the situation and do what
they considered "right."
When Conoeo refused to acknowledge that the group had a legitimate complaint, the
problems grew. The citizens could not get relief from Conoco, so they turned to the state and
federal government. After they received what they considered conflicting reports from various
state government personnel denying there was a problem of any substance, their trust of all
government agencies plummeted to a new low. They knew that much of the contamination was
"old refinery prOducts" but they also felt that since Conoeo now owned the site, the company was
legally responsible for the end results.
When they felt their concerns were not being met, they in tum organized into a citizens
group. The citizens group (PCTCe) did not trust the company for information and felt the state
was taking "Conoeo's side" in the controversy. Since Ponca City is a "company town," they did
not feel their state government, city government (most city council members and even the mayor
had Conoeo ties) or their loeal newspaper was free from bias. The PCTCC reached out to other
grassroots activist groups for gUidance and support.
There had been "Band-Aid" attempts to relieve the problem before and the end results
were the same; the problem always returned.
While cleanup of the area was what the PCTCC group wanted in the beginning, their
fears escalated as their research grew. They came to the conclusion that the area was no longer
habitable and they wanted to be moved out of the area. They were also concerned with future
use of the land and with the contaminated water removed though the groundwater lowering
proeess. They believed the contaminated water could still pose a threat to wildlife down river if it
were discharged into the Arkansas River.
Circle Drive Activists (PCTCC)
Protection of human health and welfare were the main concern of the Circle Drive
activists (PCTCC).
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"Our health was the number one issue, property values came next. It won't do
anyone any good to have money if they are dead or have poor health."
"We were afraid the area would just be covered up, not cleaned up. Too many of
the city and state officials didn't want to cross Conoco."
"We had to get the people out of there, nobody should ever live in that area again,
that was one of our main goals."
"Nobody wanted to be the bad guy and cause all the negative publicity for the
community. It took time away from our lives and families and caused stress. It was
like the civil war, families taking different sides, not speaking to each other, it was a
very stressful time for everyone, but someone had to do it."
Circle Drive activists (PCTCC) not only wanted a place at the bargaining table they
wanted to be part of the decision.
"Nobody wanted the government or the attorneys involved, at first several people
tried to work individually with Conoco but they either ignored them or insulted their
intelligence."
"All we really wanted was Conoco to sit down and talk with us one to one, but they
wouldn't do it, they never did, they had to have their lawyers."
"All the decisions were being made for us, we weren't included, it was like we didn't
have good sense."
Circle Drive activists (PCTCC) wanted a sharing of information from both industry and the
government.
"We couldn't get any cooperation from the company or the state or the U.S. EPA.
We had to drive to DaUas and look up everything for ourselves even though Conoco
and the state already had the information."
"We had open meetings, anyone could come, but we couldn't go to their meetings,
we were never invit.ed."
The Circle Drive activists' attitude toward Conoco changed as the controversy continued.
"Conoco knew there was a problem, they should have done what was right to start
with."
"Conoco was in total denial in the beginning, then they stated they would lower the
groundwater and we could take it or leave it. Conoco was arrogant."
"It created a lot of ill feeling toward Conoco when they had their employees take off
early and pack the meeting place so we couldn't get in."
"If Conoco had put their resources into getting along and working on the problem,
the results would have been better for both sides."
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-"Conoeo said they couldn't use the contaminated water in the refinery, ,it wasn't cool
enough,even they didn't want it back."
"If Conoco had did what was ,right instead of waiting until they were forced to act,
mainly by the news media, they could have bought out the area a lot cheaper."
At first the Circle Drive activists (PCTCC) expected help from the government.
"Some people in the OSDH were helpful at first but they soon got the message and
were called off. It's strange that one day we shouldn't eat the produce from our
garden but then they had a meeting and it was OK (to eat produce from the
gardens)."
'When we lodged a complaint with the state or the U.S. EPA, they always brought a
person from Conoeo with them when they came to see us. Why?"
As the controversy continued, the Circle Drive activists (PCTCC) group lost confidence in
the government to be of help with the problem.
"The U.S. EPA should have followed through in 1986 with tests and fines and
enforcement. They dropped the ball."
"OSDH had to be forced by media to do anything, city officials did only what OSDH
made them do, and the U.S. EPA didn't want any participati.on from the public."
"Government agencies should do the testing, not the companies:
The citizens of Circle Drive (PCTCC) were stung by the lack of support from the people of
Ponca City.
"Everybody says, Well these people bought down there, they knew Conoeo was
there.' But after we bought thirty years ago they put in two new smokestacks,
another row of tanks and they built Carbon Black and a fertilizer plant. It's not like it
used to be."
"Some of the local merchants donated to the citizens group and allowed them to put
up signs at their businesses, but Conoeo and the city put too much pressure on
them and they had to quit."
"Poncans for Progress split the city, which they accused us of doing, but the city
was not split until they formed."
"The Ponca City officials took Con<>eo's side, but the whole town benefited from the
cleanup, not just the ones who were moved out."
In the end the Circle Drive Citizens group (PCTCC) felt the settlement was fair.
"I don't have any hard feelings toward the company, we each had a job to do."
'We tried to be fair, nobody expected to get rich, we just wanted out, for everybody."
"Conoeo has put a lot of money in improvements to the area, it was the best thing
that ever happened to Ponca City."
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"Both the city and Conoco will eventually benefit from the clean up, but it had to be
forced upon them."
"I'm concerned about what will happen after everyone moves and all the publicity
dies down, Conoeo will still be doing their own monitoring. It seems like the state
needs to do their own testin9."
Conoeo
Participants representing industry had different views than the citizens concerning the
controversy. Excerpted below are some of industry peoples' comments.
'We were responsible for some of the problem and we wanted to do what was right;
we had a moral responsibility but we didn't deserve the negative pUblicity."
"It was wrong for the radicals to camp at the capitol. Their actions alienated
Conoeo."
"The bad pUblicity might affect our ability to stay in Ponca City in the long term."
ConoeD had a different opinion as to what drove the controversy.
"I think the citizens group formed because they had a groundwater problem, but I
also think they were trying to profit from the issue."
"It was not really a health issue, it was more a money issue."
"The citizens group needed to work more with Conoeo. Perception was reality to
both sides."
"If they had just worked with us, no outside groups, no lawsuits, then we could have
reached a settlement much sooner. When.you get outside agitators and attorneys
in the picture things get complicated."
Industry did not want the federal government involved.
'We were working with the state for a common solution; 'it just got more involved
when the U.S. EPA got involved."
Industry considerations:
'We, and I mean most industry, does take an arrogant attitude toward citizens
groups and complaints. We do th& science, base our decisions on risk analysis, and
believe we are right. We don't explain to the public because we don't think they will
understand. The public tends to factor in emotions, and cultural norms that we
don't."
"Industry can no longer have an arrogant technical scientific attitude that it is a total
waste of time to try to explain to mere mortals. Our total focus was internal
(shareholders), our new fourth stakeholder is the community in which we live and
operate in."
"Both sides need to listen, to really hear what is being said."
"Solutions need to be based on good science and not on emotions and controversy."
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-"Everything needs to be risk based, we need to consider the dollars involved and
the risks."
Government
Comments about Conoco:
"Conoco just passed it off early on. The public outcry was what drove Conoco and
the state."
"Conoco had good technical people. They had hired excellent people to work on the
problem. They came in and worked fast but when the lawyers got involved it just
slowed the process down."
"It wasn't a real health threat and Conoco and the state was slow to act; when
Conoco finally got the technical order they did a good job."
"Conoco really went above and beyond, like horizontal wells, etc. They did
innovative things, that the state wouldn't have regulations or know about"
"Conoco was slow to act but when they did they did an excellent job."
"'n the end DuPont got on the ball and was the driving force behind the cleanup."
Government officials felt their role was somewhat limited because there was no
immediate health threat to citizens.
"The public believes the government is biased towards companies. They don't
really trust us. Of course we have to go by the laws, that's what our decision is
based upon, not what someone wants necessarily."
"Information is the key to the right decision but it got so information was greeted with
skepticism by the public."
"Conoco, OSDH and OWRB had a three-way meeting and gave the information to
the locals who greeted the information with hysteria."
"In the future we should have meetings-lnvite regulators and industry consultants
to advise the citizens groups. Since citizens don't trust the govemment."
"The citizens group didn't have anyone really sharp technically to challenge
information."
Even govemment officials had different opinions.
"The group (PCTCC) really lost credibility with the camp-out at the capitol. That was
an embarrassment to everyone and just showed how radical they were."
"The (PCTCC) camp out at the capital got media attention and things began to happen."
Government is also limited in what their actions can be.
"Our laws are sometimes economically driven, not socially driven."
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'We need to be open, and sha.re and receive information, this ,is critical. The
agencies do have a game plan but sometimes they're not good at sharing this
information."
"The problem just got too political, for everyone."
"Lawsuits cause problems but in the long run it also keeps companies on their toes."
Summary
Citizens of Ponca City had different views of the Circle Drive Controversy, mainly
depending on where they lived and worked in the town.
The Circle Drive activist group (PCTCC) maintained that their concern was the long-term
health effects of the pollution and their property values. They were concerned that the cleanup by
Conoco would be a cover-up, and the main problem would remain and resurface again in a time
of high ground water. They not only wanted the area cleaned up but also wanted assurance that
the area would never be used as a residential area again. They also felt the ptan to divert the
contaminated groundwater to the Arkansas River might impact people or wildlife farther
downstream.
A few of the residents had tried to work with Conoeo on a "one-to-one basis" but got
nowhere. They were disillusioned, as they had enjoyed a good working relationship with Conoeo
in past years. The group felt that a solution could have been reached much sooner and at less
expense if Conoeo had worked directly with them.
The Poncans for Progress was a citizens support group for Conoeo consisting mainly of
Conoeo employees and city government officials. They were concerned with keeping Conoeo,
the largest employer, in the city.
Circle Drive residents had appealed to the state and then the federal government
expecting support. When they felt they received neither, their trust in all government suffered.
Conoeo did not want to take the blame for industry practices that had probably oecurred
many years earlier by other companies. They would be setting a legal liability precedence that
could be very costly. They felt the Circle Drive group (PCTCC) was being unreasonable and
should have been satisfied with lowering, the groundwater in the area. They did not believe the
group understood the "science" behind the suggested solution. Conoeo felt money was the
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driving force behind the group's complaints. Canoeo thought a solution could have been reached
sooner if "outside groups and attorneys" had not become involved,
State and Federal government had to go by the law, not what some citizens group
wanted. They were used to working closely with industry, which caused a further decline in their
relationship with the Circle Drive residents,
The personnel with the state and local government and Conoeo were embarrassed by
the actions of the protest group (PCTCe) when they camped at the state capitol and brought
national media attention to the problem.
The Circle Drive activists (PCTCe} did not trust the company or the government to reach
a fair decision on their behalf. Conoeo did not trust the Circle Drive activists (PCTCC), nor did
they believe the group was able to understand "science" and rationally make a decision on such
matters.
All groups, industry, citizens and government, felt the main stumbling bloek to settlement
was the retention of attorneys, Conoco had their own attorneys but was upset when the Circle
Drive residents retained council.
Neither Conoco nor state or local government was interested in having members of the
Circle Drive group (PCTCC) participate in decision-making meetings, They made the decisions
and then considered the Circle Drive group (PCTCC) as "hysterical" when they were presented
with the results and disagreed,
The result of the interviews suggests that distrust fueled the controversy and extended
the time it took for a settlement to be reached. Developing trust among the parties and having
citizens' input into the decision-making process would have facilitated reaching a solutton to the
problem much sooner.
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CHAPTER VI
PREFERENCE RANKING OF DECISION CRI,TERIA AND
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION STRATEGIES
Introduction
In chapter 5, results of the open-ended and quasi-structured personal interviews were
presented. In chapter 6, as part of this effort to better understand contamination controversies, it
was important to determine what, if any, differences exist among stakeholders' preferences
concerning the criteria that should be used in making environmental decisions and the means by
which the public should participate in making these decisions. Preferences were elicited by a
technique known as card ranking.
Card Ranking Technique and Analysis
Procedure
The stakeholder participants in this stUdy were given a card-ranking exercise immediately
following the a sorting exercise discussed in Chapter 7. The card ranking exercise consisted of
two parts: decision criteria and public participation strategies.
In the first part of the card ranking exercise, stakeholders were first asked to rank thirteen
cards, each containing criterion, with a brief description, which could be used in making
siting/environmental decisions (see Appendix C). Participants were instructed to read through all
13 cards and than linearly arrange them from least preferred (rank order =13) to most preferred
(rank order =1).
In the second part of the card ranking exercise, the stakeholders were asked to repeat
this process - this time with nine cards (see Appendix D) on each of which was described, a
public participation strategy that could be used in making siting/environmental decisions. In both
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-sorting exercises, after arranging the cards in linear fashion, the stakeholders were asked to
divide the cards into three groups - those that they judged as having high importance, those
having moderate importance. and those having low or no importance. The raw decision criteria
and raw participation strategy card ranking data are included in Appendix F.
Results of the rank order exercises were combined across all stakeholders and by
stakeholder demographic type (govemmentlindustry and citizen). In both cases, the restillts were
analyzed using five analytical methods, which are discussed, in the next section. The fifth
method, a composite of the results of the first four, was used in interpreting the card ranking
results. This analysis is followed by a discussion of the public participation strategy ranking
results. Finally, the relationship between these rank order results is explored.
Card Rank Analytic Methods
Five card-ranking analyses were used to deduce a composite rank order of decision
criteria and public participation strategies across stakeholders and stakeholder types. Each of
the first four methods has its strengths and weaknesses; for this reason therefore, the rank order
used in the interpretation of card ranking data was computed using a fifth method that combines
the results of the first four.
Analytic Method #1: Median Rank Order
The median rank order method was selected because of its suitability in finding a
measure of central tendency in ordinal data. The individual rank order scores of each decision
criterion and each pUblic participation strategy were arranged in ascending order and the middle
(median) rank order score was determined. The median, as the measure of central tendency for
ordinal data, has an advantage over other descriptive statistics because it excludes outlying
(extremely high or low) ranks. Unfortunately, it suffers from a loss 0' data richness by the loss of
outlier rank scores. It also suffers from failure to consider the relative importance that
stakeholders attached to each criterion of strategy.
The composite median rank order was determined by arranging the criterion-specific and
strategy-specnic median scores from high (low preference) to low (high preference).
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Analytic Method #2: Individual Rank Order
The individual rank order method maximizes the resolution of the combined rank order by
preserving the full richness of the data in the composite results. In this method, the individual
rank order scores were summed for each criterion and strategy. The composite rank order was
computed by arranging the sums in a manner identical to that used for median scores. Though
this method is richer than the median method, it still fails to take into account the subjective
importance that each criterion and strategy has to the stakeholder, and it is sensitive to extreme
values.
Analytic Method #3: Group Rank Order
The group ranking method is useful because it distinguishes the relative importance that
each criterion and strategy has to the stakeholder. To compute a composite rank order score
using this method, each individual's criterion and strategy importance rating (high =1, moderate =
2, low =3) was summed with those of other stakeholders. The sums were arranged as above to
deduce the composite rank order. Though this method captures relative importance, it suffers
from a lack of resolution (scores vary from 1-3, rather than from 1-13 or 1·9 for decision criteria
and public participation strategies, respectively).
Analytic Method #4: Weighted Individual Rank Order
In an attempt to combine the advantages of the individual and group rank order methods,
these methods were combined. The individual rank order scores were first multiplied by an
assigned value as follows: high importance =1, moderate importance =2, and low importance =
3. These products were than summed by criterion or strategy to compute a composite score for
that criterion or strategy. The final rank order was computed by arranging the summed products
in ascending order as described above. Though this method combines the advantages of the
individual and group ranking methods, it still suffers from the bias produced by extreme values.
Analytic Method #5: Overall Rank Order
The overall rank order, calculated from the four rank orders described above, represents
the composite rank order of criteria and strategies. The overall rank order score was computed
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as the sum of the median, individual, group and weighted individual rank orders. The composite
overall rank order was determined us'ing the same ascending array of rank order scores as was
used in the four previous method§.
In the discussion of card sort results, a criterion is referred to as method-independent
when the rank order for that criterion is constant across each ranking method. Method
independence was common among those criteria and strategies that were ranked near the
preferred or least preferred; minor mixing of rank orders was found for those criteria and
strategies ranked in the middle.
Decision Criteria Preference Ranking Results
Decision Criteria Considered
As mentioned in the chapter introduction, 13 decision criteria were considered by the
stakeholders in their ranking exercises. A brief description of each is presented below. The
specific definitions of each criterion are included in Appendix C.
Environmental Criteria
Six of the 13 criteria can be included in this criterion grouping. Four of the six are
primarily technical criteria: Scientific risk estimates, technicaVlegal education, access to
information, and use of alternative technologies. The fifth and sixth are non-technical but are
included here because they also relate to environmental concerns: personal view toward
technology and personal risk perception/judgment. It is expected that the ranking of these criteria
will tend to be clustered.
Economic Criteria
Three criteria concern economic impacts: economic impact on the company, economic
impact on the community, and fairness and justice. While the first two deal with allocational
impacts, the third concems the equity of the distribution of risks, costs, and benefits among
stakeholders. As in the case of technical and environmental criteria, it is expected that these
three criteria will tend to be clustered.
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Community-Based Criteria
Two of the criteria involve community-based concerns. Community disruption and
understanding local culture are directly tied to community~level impacts. Again, it is expected that
these two criteria will be clustered ,in the ranking results.
Institutional Trust Criteria
Trust in government and industry was the eighth criterion presented to stakeholders for
their consideration in judging the relative importance that the criteria should play in siting
decisions. No particular relationship between trust and any other criterion is expected, though it
is certainly reasonable to expect that the importance of trust may vary directly with the importance
of citizen involvement and non-technical criteria and indirectly with technical environmental
criteria. The relationship between trust, technical criteria, and citizen involvement is proposed
because those stakeholders who believe that trust is not important can be expected to believe
that citizens should defer to institutional expertise and discretion; thus technical criteria would
dominate and citizen involvement would subordinate. On the other hand. those who believe that
institutional trust is highly important to siting decisions may be inclined to insist on increased
citizen involvement and the inclusion of non-technical environmental and community-based
criteria in decision making.
Citizen Involvement Criteria
The relative importance of citizen involvement in siting decision-making is tested with this
criterion. As mentioned in the trust criterion paragraph, though no particular clustering of this
criterion with any other is explicitly anticipated, it is reasonable to suppose that those who judge
this criterion as important may be less inclined to judge technical criteria 8S important and more
inclined to believe that institutional trust is important.
Industry and Government Preferences
Table 3 presents the distribution of decision criterion card rankings among industry and
government stakeholders who supported Conoeo's proposal to lower the ground-water
contamination in order to clean up of the Circle Drive area. The criterion that those in this group
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most preferred (order-independent rank 'of 1) is, scientif,ic risk estimates. All of the industry and
government ranked ,it number one. They are comfortable with scientific risk estimates and put
their faith in the results. This result is evidence to the claim that this group prefers objective.
scientific arguments in making environmental decisions.
The second most-preferred (also order-independent) decision making criterion is access
to information. This preference indicated that it is important to this group to have all the
information before a decision can be made.
The third most-preferred (also order-independent) decision criterion among industry and
government stakeholder is citizen involvement. They believe citizens should be involved in some
steps of decision making. They believe if the citizens were more educated and understood
technical and legal information, they would be more inclined to see the industry/government
perspective.
The fourth most preferred decision criterion among government and industry
stakeholders is alternative technologies. Both individual order ranking and group order ranking
also put this criterion in fourth place. Industry and government favor the use of alternative
technologies but want a/l industries to have the same requirements.
The fifth most preferred decision criteria among government and industry is personal
judgment of risks. This criterion is also ranked number five by both individual and group rank
order. The respondents explanation demonstrates that they were referring to their own judgment
and other similarly trained professionals not non-technical trained persons.
Technical and legal education was ranked number six. Industry and government
respondents are pro-education. especially for the non-technically-trained public. They believe if
the general public were better educated on technical issues it would not oppose decisions made
by technical criteria.
Ranking numbers seven and eight, fairness, an economic concern, and institutional trust
are areas where industry and government feel satisfied and are therefore are of little concern.
Community disruption, personal views toward technol'ogy, and understanding local cultur,e ranked
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-9th through 11 th respectively. Two of these criteria are community based and directly tied to
community~level impacts and the other is an environmental criterion.
Community and company economic interest ranked last. This rank suggests that industry
and government might not put as much irnport.ance on economics of the company and community
as the citizens believe.
Citizen Activists Preferences
Table 4 presents the results of citizens' decision criteria card ranking. The most
preferred criterion is access to information, followed by citizen involvement and fairness. Citizens
believe it is very important that they have access to obtain relevant information in a timely manner
and in easily understandable form and that they be involved in environmental decisions that may
affect their community. The third, fairness, concerns the equality of the distribution of risks, costs,
and benefits among stakeholders.
Institutional trust and technicaVlegal education is the fourth criterion for the citizens.
Those who are not technically educated need some level of trust in the institutions (government
and industry) that are to make these decisions. Without this trust citizens feel they must be
involved in many of the steps of decision-making. One citizen stated that trust should be the
number one criterion but was doubtful that industry or government could ever earn trust. To
better understand the technical issues, citizens feel they need more technical and legal
education.
The sixth criteria are personal view of technology and community disruption. Personal
view of technology is an environmental concern. Community disruption is a concern about the
whole impact on a community, from infrastructure and jobs to number eight, understanding local
culture. These are non-technical issues that are not usually considered important by technically
trained professionals.
Alternative technologies, number eight, is an environmental criterion that citizens believe
could greatly reduce the need for waste sites across the country. This criterion also ranked
number eight in the median rank score.
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Scientific risk estimates ranked number ten in the overall rank, but was ranked in the
preferred category by 2 of the citizen respondents; the majority ranked it low preference. This is
almost opposite (see comparison of Stakeholders Decision Criterion Chart 7) to the ranking of the
technically trained professionals all of who ranked it number 1.
Economic impacts on the community ranked number eleven in the overall rank order,
individual rank order, and the weighted rank order scores. Citizens with environmental concerns,
although concerned with the economic impact on a community, believe that the environmental
welfare of a community is more important.
Personal judgment of risks is an environmental concern that is an individual
measurement of how much risk an individual is comfortable with. This level will vary with the
situation such as seen or unseen, and familiar or unfamiliar risks.
Economic impact on the company ranked last in the individual rank, group rank, weighted
individual rank and overall rank order scores. Environmentally sensitive citizens do not feel the
economic welfare of a company should be a major factor in environmental decisions.
Comparison of Decision Criteria Preferences
Tables 6 and 7 present an overall rank-order comparison of decision-criteria preference
rankings by each stakeholder group. This section identifies the important similarities and
differences among the stakeholder groups.
Citizen-Government/Industry
Both ciUzens and govemmentlindustry agree that access to information and technical and
legal education are very important criteria for slightly different reasons. Government/Industry
would like for the citizens to be educated so they might understand the many technical and legal
issues involved in siting and contamination decisions. Citizens' distrust of governmentlindustry
motivates them to demand that information be provided so that the community can independently
judge the propriety of a siting/contamination decision.
Citizens and industry/government both rank citizen involvement very high, but with a
different idea of what the involvement should be. Citizens want to be a part of the decision
66
-~
J
..,
~!
making process and have input into the decisions made while governmenVindustry believe
citizens have adequate input into the process now and until they are better educated on technical
issues. have very little to offer to the process.
While the citizens ranked fairness. institutional trust. personal view of technology. and
community disruption much higher than did governmenVindustry. both ranked economics of
community low and economics of the company last.
GovernmenVindustry ranked scientific risk assessment high while the citizens ranked it
low, again demonstrating the difference between technically and non-technically educated
people. The Govemmentlindustry group is much more confident in using a risk-based decision-
making process.
While local culture did not rank high with the citizens, it ranked even lower with the
governmenVindustry respondents.
Public Participation Strategy Preference Ranking Results
Public Participation Strategies Considered
The nine participation strategies the stakeholders considered can be arranged along a
gradient from no citizen power (preempt,ion) to maximum citizen power (citizen control). Low
power strategies do not provide any meaningful opportunity for influencing a decision and include
public hearing and comment (one way communication) and consultation (two-way
communication). Moderate power strategies offer a greater chance for citizen influence on the
outcome and include non-binding agreement (face·to-face discussions). mediation (third party
facilitation), and binding arbitration (third party decision). High power strategies offer substantial
influence opportunities and include oversight board (shared power), referendum (community
approval or veto of entire package). and of course, citizen control. It can be expected that citizen
activists may prefer high power strategies while government/industry may prefer low power
strategies for the citizens.
Specific definitions of each of these strategies are included in Appendix F.
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-IndustrtlGovemment Participation Strategies
Table 6 presents the results of the govemmentlindustry stakeholders' preference
rankings of public participation strategies. The most preferred strategies for governmentlindustry
was pUblic hearing/comment (one way communication) and consultation (two-way
communication); both are a low citizen power strategies. Low power strategies, while providing
some citizen input, do not provide any meaningful opportunity for influencing a decision.
Non-binding agreement (face-to-face discussions), a moderate power strategy, and
oversight board (shared power) were ranked third and fourth respectively. Mediation (third party
facilitation) a moderate power strategy, and pre-emption (no citizen control) were the fifth and
sixth strategies chosen. Binding arbitration (third party decision), a moderate power strategy, and
referendum (community approval or veto of entire package), a high power strategy tied for
seventh place.
The high power strategy for citizens came in, as can be expected, last in the ranking
sorts for governmentlindustry. These results imply that govemmentlindustry stakeholders are not
willing to give up power in the siting/contamination decision process. While they may believe they
have to have some citizen input, they would like to keep i,t to a minimum.
Citizen Participation Strategies
Table 7 presents the results of citizens' public participation strategy preferences. Their
most preferred participation strategies are oversight board (shared power) and referendum
(community approval or veto of entire package), both high power strategies, with a rank order of
1. Public hearing/comment (one way communication), low power strategy, and non-binding
agreement (face-to-face discussions) a moderate power strategy, were tied for rank order number
3. Citizen control (high power) and mediation (third party facilitation), moderate power strategies
came in fourth and sixth respectively. Consultation (two-way communication) a low power
strategy, and binding arbitration (third party decision), a moderate power strategy came in
seventh and eighth respectively. Pre-emption (no citizen control) came last in rank order.
Citizens are willing to share power but they want a meaningful participation in decision making.
They are not really interested in having full citizen control.
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Comparison of Public Participation Strategy Preferences
Table 8 presents an overall rank order comparison of participation strategy preferences
by each stakeholder group.
Citizen-GovernmenUlndustry
The citizens prefer the oversight board, with a rank order of 1 (high power) while
governmenUindustry gave this criterion a rank order of four. Referendum (high power) also tied
for a rank order of first by the citizens and a rank order of seven by the governmenUindustry
respondents. This is not surprising since governmenUindustry would prefer that citizens have a
low power option.
While governmenUindustry chose public hearing/consultation (low power) for their first
choice, citizens gave it a rank order of three. This is the participation strategy that was being
used in the Circle Drive Conoco controversy and it left the citizens very frustrated, feeling that
they did not have any real input into the process. Government'industry did not see any need to
change the process, believing it gave the citizens adequate participation. Consultation (low
power). chosen second by governmenVindustry. was ranked number seven by the citizens.
Citizens felt they would still be at a disadvantage with this process. Both citizens and
governmenVindustry chose non-binding agreement (moderate power) as their third rank order.
Pre-emption (no citizen power) was ranked nine by the citizens and sixth by
governmenUindustry. Industry chose citizen control as its last choice while citizens ranked it
fourth. Neither of these participation strategies was very popular with either group.
RelatIonship Between Decision Criteria and Public Participation Strategies
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the decision criteria and participation strategies are
directly and indirectly related and will tend to be grouped together according to their relationship.
This section will identify and discuss the clustering of decision criteria and participation strategies
as indicated by their overall rank order.
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-Relationship Among Industry's Preferences
Decision Criteria
The most important decision criteria for govemmentlindustry are 5 of the 6 environmental
criteria. This group is tightly clustered, particularly the technical criteria; scientific risk estimates,
access to information, altemative technologies, personal judgment of risks, and technicaVlegal
information. It was expected that these criteria would be clustered.
The next favored criteria among government/industry is fairness, an economic criteria
concerning the equitable distribution of risks, costs, and benefits among stakeholders. This
criterion is not clustered at this level.
The next cluster contains the criterion institutional trust, community disruption, personal
views of technology and understanding local culture. This cluster of criteria is expected.
The last cluster (2 of a possible 3) is economic impact on the community and on the
company, which is tied for the lowest rank order for government/industry. This cluster suggests
that govemmentlindustry is not willing to take chances with the environment even for the benefit
of community and company economics.
Participation Strategies
Governmentlindustry's low preference for citizen involvement in decision-making criteria
is shown by their number 1 ranking for public hearing/comment, a low power strategy that
provides little citizen input into the final decision. Consultation their second choice, is also a low
power strategy, and their third choice, non-binding agreement, offers only mod~rate power but
does at least offer two-way communication,
Interestingly, an oversight board is govemmentlindustry's fourth preference and the
citizens' first choice. An oversight board would allow substantial influence with all parties. This
results suggests that govemmentlindustry is willing to share power if necessary. Though they
would prefer the status quo, public hearing, which from their perspective is working by providing
public participation with very limited citizen input into the decisions.
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-Relationship Among Citizens' Preferences
Decision Criteria
Citizens differ from govemmenVindustry in their decision criteria and participation
strategy preferences, especially with respect to technicaVenvironmental criteria and the extent to
which citizens should be involved in the decision-making process.
The citizens loosely clustered the envjronmental criteria with access to information,
faimess, technicaVlegal information, and personal views on technology being in the preferred
category. While these were environmental issues, only two would be considered technical:
number one,. preferred access to information, and number four, technicaVlegal education.
In the moderate rank, community criteria was clustered with community disruption and
understanding local culture. Citizens seem to being saying that while these are important, other
issues are more important.
Clustered in the low end are two technical issues, altemative technologies and sdentific
risk estimates. Like industry, the citizens clustered economic impact on community and industry
on the lowest or least preferred ranking. Neither citizens nor govemmenVindustry seem to be
willing to take chances with the environment for economic gain.
Participation Strategies
Citizens' preferences among participation strategies tend to further support their demand
for citizens' involvement in decision making. For example, citizens' preference for public
participation includes high and moderate power strategies. However they recognize they are not
competent alone to make siting/contamination decisions (they rank citizen control fourth) nor do
they want to be excluded from the siting/contamination process (preemption is ranked ninth).
Oversight board (shared power) and referendum (community approval or veto of entire package)
tied for first preference in the citizens group. Citizens are willing to share power and control but
do not want to be excluded. Public hearing/comment is a criterion that citizens are familiar with
but which they have had little success in influencing decisions in the Ponca City controversy.
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-Summary
How stakeholders ranked decision criteria .and participation strategies sheds light on why
the Circle DrivelPonca City controversy developed and continued. Citizens felt they were denied
access to information that was available from both Conoco and the state government. As a
result, citizens were motivated to organize and participate to ensure that independent access to
information was available for making personal judgments about the controversy. Citizens were
unwilling to be excluded from the decision-making process. They were unwilling to defer to
government expertise and as the controversy continued, their trust in all govemment-·clty, state
and federal.--deteriorated.
Citizens see participation demands as a trust issue, specifically. trust in government as
regUlators of the industry they work closely with, and trust in industry which stand to bear the
financial costs of any clean-up operations. They distrust the technical information given to them
by both government and industry. They see close political ties between government and industry
and do not believe govemment can be impartial in its decisions. With their first choice of
participation strategies. oversight board and referendum, they believe they would have some
control over the process and outcome. It is reasonable to believe that citizens' trust depends
upon government and industry's willingness to involve them in the decision making process and
provide them with relevant information necessary for an informed opinion.
Governmentlindustry stakeholders, on the other hand, believe technical arguments for
the solution of the ground water controversy should dominate the decision. Their confidence in
scientific risk assessment can be explained by their familiarity with technical analysis, which they
believe proves that public health and the environment are adequately protected. Government
and industry do not believe that citizens should have much of a role in the decision making
process until they become better informed on relevant technical and legal issues.
When decisions are made with technical and legal expertise, neither government nor
industry understands Why citizens object, even though they have had no part in the solution. Until
government and industry realize the importance of non-technical issues in the overall decision
process, conflict with the public will continue.
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TABLE 3
DECISION CRITERIA PREFERENCES
(Govemmentllndustry)
Weighted
Median Individual Individual ave...n
Rank Rank Group Rank Rank Raltk
Criterion Score Order Score Order HI Mod Low SCore Order Score Order Score Order
Economics
Community 0 8 31 1 0 2 1 7 10 5 9 38 13
Economics
Company 0 8 33 15 0 2 1 7 10 5 7 38 13
Scientific Risk
Estimates 3 7 5 2 3 0 0 3 1 9 1 17 1
Personal Risk
Judament 1 1 18 5 1 2 0 5 4 17 5 24 5
Access to
Information 2 5 4 1 2 1 0 4 2 3 3 18 2
Personal View
Technoloav 1 1 27 9 1 1 1 6 7 21 6 33 10
Fairness 0 8 25 8 0 3 0 6 7 6 6 29 7
Institutional
Trusts 0 8 29 10 0 3 0 6 7 6 6 31 8
Local culture 0 8 31 11 0 2 1 7 10 25 7 36 11
Community
Disruption 0 8 23 7 0 2 1 7 10 25 7 32 9
Citizen
Involvement 2 5 11 3 2 1 0 4 2 12 4 21 3
TechnicaV ,
Legal 1 1 19 6 1 2 0 5 4 5 5 25 6
Education
Altemative
Technoloaies 1 1 17 4 1 2 0 5 4 5 5 23 4
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TABLE 4
DECISION CRITERIA PREFERENCES
(Citizens)
Weighted
Median Individual ! Individu I Ovenll
Rank Rank Group Rink Rank RInk
Criterion Score Order Score Order Hi Mod Low Score Order Score Order SCore Order
Economics
Community 2 5 82 11 2 2 5 21 10 110 11 37 11
Economics
Company 1 1 97 13 1 3, 6 25 13 169 13 40 13
Scientific Risk
Estimates 2 5 79 10 2 3 4 20 7 70 9 31 10
Personal Risk
Judgment 3 7 62 7 3 2 4 21 10 70 9 28 12
Access to
Information 7 13 28 1 7 3 0 13 2 1 1 17 1
Personal View
Technoloov 1 1 75 8 1 5 3 20 7 56 7 23 6
Faimess 6 11 42 3 ,6 2 1 13 2 6 3 19 3
Institutional
Trusts 5 9 48 4 5 2 2 15 5 20 4 22 4
Local Culture 1 1 83 12 1 4 4 21 10 120 12 35 8
Community
Disruption 1 1 75 8 1 5 3 20 7 56 7 23 6
Citizen
Involvement 7 13 38 2 7 2 0 11 1 2 2 18 2
Technical/
Legal 5 9 53 5 5 3 1 14 4 20 4 22 4
Education
Altemative
Technologies 4 8 57 6 4 4 1 15 5 30 6 25 8
TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF STAKEHOLDERS' DECISION CRITERIA PREFERENCES
CRITERION Citizen Government/Industry
Overall Rank Order Overall Rank Order
Economic Impact Community 11 13
Economic Impact Company 13 13
Scientific Risk Estimates 10 1
Personal Judament of Risks 12 5
Access to Information 1 2
Personal View Technology 6 10
Fairness 3 7
Institutional Trust 4 8
Local Culture 8 11
Community Disruption 6 9
Citizen Involvement 2 3
Technical/Legal Education 4 6
Alternative Technologies 8 4
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION STRATEGY PREFERENCES
(Go.vemmentllndustry)
W.lgttt~
Median Individual Individual Overall
Rank Rank Group Rank Rank Rank
Strategy Score Order Score Order HI Mod Low SCore Order Score Order Score Order
Pre·emotion 3 2 11 2 1 0 2 7 8 7 8 20 6
Public
Comment 3 2 9 1 2 1 0 4 1 4 2 6 1
Consultation 2 1 11 2 2 0 1 5 3 5 5 11 2
Non-Binding
Agreement 4 5 13 5 2 1 0 4 1 3 1 12 3
Mediation 5 6 13 5 1 2 0 5 3 5 5 19 5
Binding
Arbitration 6 7 17 7 1 1 1 6 6 6 7 27 7
Oversight
Board 3 2 12 4 2 4 1 5 3 5 5 14 4
Referendum 6 7 17 7 1 1 1 6 6 6 7 27 7
Citizen
Control 9 9 19 9 0 0 3 9 9 9 9 36 9
TABLE 7
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION STRATEGY PREFERENCES
(Citizens)
Weighted
Median Individual Individual Overall
Rank Rank Group Rank Rank Rank
Strategy Score Order Score Order HI Mod Low SCore Order Score Order Score Order
Pre-emotion 1 1 60 9 1 3 5 22 9 81 9 37 9
Public
Comment 6 6 35 2 6 3 0 12 2 4 2 14 3
Consultation 2 2 58 7 2 3 4 20 8 56 8 25 7
Non-Binding
Agreement 3 3 41 3 3 5 1 16 4 12 4 14 3
Mediation 1 1 55 8 1 6 2 20 6 48 7 22 6
Binding
Arbitration 4 6 43 4 4 4 1 15 13 12 3 28 8
Oversight
Board 8 9 21 1 1 0 22 1 22 22 1 12 1
Referendum 3 3 48 5 2 3 17 4 20 20 4 12 1
Citizen
Control 4 6 48 5 4 2 3 16 6 30 6 22 4
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Table 8
COMPARISON OF STAKEHOLDERS' PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION STRATEGY PREFERENCES
Participation Strategies Citizens Govemmentllndustrv
Pre-emption 9 6
Public HearinolComment 3 1
Consultation 7 2
Non-Bindina Aareement 3 ~ 3
Mediation 6 5
BindinQ Arbitration 8 7
Oversight Board 1 4
Referendum 1 7
Citizen Control 4 9
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CHAPTER VII
Q FACTOR RESULTS
Two Factor Q Analysis
The 47-item Q sort data was entered into a software program known as PC QUANAl
(van Tubergen 1975). Two, three, four and five factor extraction's were accomplished using the
principal components method. These factors were rotated to simple structure by varimax
rotation, which minimizes unexplained variance.
Only the two-factor solution was retained for analysis. Reasons for keeping the two-
factor solution are that (1) each retained factor explained at least 15% of the total variance; (2)
each factor produced high and pure factor loadings; (3) the total explained variance increased
only 4% with the third factor (The third factor has theoretical or field interest but cannot be
defended statistically); (4) additional factors produced higher commonalties and lower purities,
indicating that two factors best represented unique stakeholder perspectives; and (5) the factors
are of theoretical importance. Each common factor score array was interpreted by the author and
validated by telephone confirmation with the stakeholder whose perspective best correlated with
the perspective manifest by the common factor. The two factors collectively explained 50% of the
total variance.
Table 9 contains the re-ordered factor score matrix for the two-factor solution after
varimax rotation. The critical value for a significant factor loading is 0.451 (using a confidence
level of 99.9%). This value is calculated as the two-tailed z score corresponding to a specific
level of significance (in this case, a=O.ool) mUltiplied by the standard error of the loading
estimate, where SE, equals 1/ Nand N =number of Q items. Bold factor loadings in Table 9 are
those that are statistically significant Nineteen participant's loadings proved significant, 1 loading
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was confounded, (PSC 3 loaded on factors 1 and 2). PLC 9, PSC 2, PSG2, and PLC5 were not
significantly loaded on any of the factors.
TABLE 9
RE-ORDERED FACTOR MATRIX
PARTICIPANTS FACfORA FACfORB COMMONALITY
LOADING LOADING
FACTOR A
PLC 10 Waitress .815 .109 .966
PLC 6 Business owner .695 .080 .949
PLC 2 Self employed (media) .713 ·.205 .923
PSC 1 Ret. Business owner .728 .134 .912
PLC 1 Self employed .769 .249 .887
PLC 3 Rt. Business owner .673 .239 .868
PLC 4 Business owner .699 .306 .834
PLC 8 Day care operator .759 -.178 .830
PLC 11 Attorney .509 .360 .647
PLC 7 Secretary .454 .046 .567
FACTORB
PS 11 Refinery manager
PSGI0WRB
PL G3 Hydrologist
PS G3 Government regulator
PL 13 Secretary
PLG40SDH
PSW Curator Museum
PS 12 Environmental Director
PS C3 Teacher. Business owner
NOT LOADED ON ANY FACTOR
PLC 5 Business owner
PSG 2 Senator
PSC 2 Business own
PLC 9 Selfemployed
-.074
-.077
.165
.272
.310
.166
.302
-.293
.513
.092
.405
.348
.346
.495
.880
.806
.757
.793
.737
.680
.512
.590
.326
.393
.341
.432
.955
.893
.876
.874
.863
.834
.814
.752
.537
.634
.353
.422
.381
-
Table 10 presents the z-scores for each of the statements comprising each of the factors.
The z-scores are used to represent the structure of a common factor by identifying each
statement's relative importance. These scores are used in interpreting the perspectives held by
those participants who significantly load on the factor. Those statements which score nearer to
±1.00 are particularly useful because these statements are those which elicited strong reactions
(indicating higher quantsal of importance) by the participants. Differences between item scores
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across factors, especially for those z-score items varying by more than 1.0 (distinguishing items),
and those less than 1.0 (consensus items), also aid factor interpretation.
TABLE 10
TYPAL ARRAY Z-SCORES
QITEM FACTOR
A B
1. Waste facility means economic growth and prQsperity for the
community. -1.3 -.7
2. Offering cash payments to a community is the same as a bribe. .2 -.4
3. When jobs are scarce, an increase in employment is good even if
there is resulting pollution. -1.4 1.6
4. If environmental restrictions limit the ability of a company to make a
profit, the restrictions should be lifted. -1.8 1.5
5. Industry works with communities to maintain a good public image. -.2 .4
6. Scientific risk assessment should be the major consideration in siting
decisions. -.7 1.3
7. Citizens need to control which risks they have to put UP with. .2 .8
8. We should not take any chances with the environment. 1.2 .0
9. I tolerate risk as a fact of life, but I don't like it. .0 .8
10. It doesn't matter how much we pollute today because tomorrow's
technoloay will solve the problem. -1.9 2.1
11. The world would be a better place to live if we could go back to the
Qood old days. -.6 1.2
12. It is better to put facilities in communities with high unemployment;
the people there need the jobs. -.8 -.9
13. The People who benefit the most from a waste facility are not the
ones who bear the risk. .9 .3
14. Government and industry know what they are doing; they are the
experts. -1.8 -.4
15. Cost effectiveness is more important to industry and government
than environmental issues. .9 -.8
16. The government adequately enforces environmental laws even
when it costs them money. -2.0 .6
17. Industry usually complies with environmental laws even when it
costs them money. -1.8 .1
18. Environmental laws are full of loopholes for ·industry's advantage. 1.7 -1.4
19. The character of a community changes after a waste facility is
located there. -.1 -.4
20. Allowing a waste facility to locate in a community divides a
community. .3 .0
21. Waste facilities aive a community a bad reputation. -.7 -.6
22. Citizens should be involved in every step of a sitinQ decision. .7 1.3
23. Citizens have ample opportunity to be involved in siting decisions in
their community. -1.0 -.0
24. Industry, government and the pUblic should decide together what
level of pollution should be allowed. .5 2.0
25. All information should be shared in easily understood language as
soon as it is available. .6 1.5
26. Who provides the information makes a difference to me; the person
. must be honest. 1.2 'I 1.1
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A B
27. It is really hard to know if decision makers have the same values as
, do.
.8 .5
28. It is impossible to know whether or not a process is really safe
without adequate technical education. .2 .7
29. If the public were more familiar with the operation of a waste
facility. they would be more willing to consider it. -0.9 .7
30. Citizens should have their own experts. -.3 .9
31. We would all be better off if the legal procedures were easier to
follow. .4 1.6
32. Government shouldn't be trusted in makino siting decisions. .8 -.9
33. Government uses citizen opinion against citizens. -.2 -1.0
34. Economic special interests have too much influence in siting
decisions. 1.0 -.2
35. The people living in a community know what is best for them. .6 .4
36. Citizens should initially oPpOse all propOsals for sitina bv industry. -0.4 -1.0
37. It is better to be active today than to be radioactive tomorrow. 1.4 .8
38. If you have enough money. yOU can Qet away with Dollutina. .8 -1.4
39. Conflict in decision makina is necessary and healthy. -.3 .6
40. Consensus is impossible when activists become involved in
environmental decisions. -1.1 -.6
41. The chief function of government is to SUPDort the economy. -0.3 I -1.5
42. Just being physically present in situations where environmental
decisions are made is not enouah. .2 .8
43. The siting process is unfair because results provide greater risks to
the people who are ethnically different or pOor. .8 -.1
44. Environmental radicals are necessary to bring balance to the
issues. .0 .6
45. There are clean technologies available that must be used now to
reduce Dollution. 1.6 1.1
46. Government and industry skew their risk estimates to suit their own
purposes. .9 -1.4
47. Industry must be required to recycle. reduce waste. and use safer
techniques and raw materials. 1.7 1.4
Q Factor Interpretation
Q factor interpretation is accomplished by analyzing scores across factors, incorporating
information obtained from other techniques used in this research and theoretical insights from
other relevant studies. All factor interpretations are given short descriptive titles. that best
characterize the perspective revealed by the factor scores. Bold z-scores represent the factor
that is the subject of the immediate discussion. Each of the Two-factor interpretations is
explained and defended below.
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Factor A: Guardians lGSl
This factor accounts for 35% of the total explained variance and is the dominant factor
among the two factors found in the study. The Guardians (GS) factor represents the perspective
shared by nine of the Ponca City Circle Drive (peTCC) citizen activists, and a local attorney,
QITEM GS TE
18. Environrnentallaws are full of loopholes for industry advantaQe. 1.7 -1.4
47. Industry must be required to recycle, reduce wastes. And use safe
techniques and raw material. 1.7 1.4
45. There are clean technologies available that must be used now to
reduce pollution. 1.6 1.1
While the Guardians (GS) do not believe environmental taws adequately protect them,
industry believes the laws are adequate. The Technical Experts (TE) also believe industry should
be required to reduce waste, recycle and use safer technologies. This is a stewardship issue for
both factors and a trust issue for the guardians.
37. It is better to be active toda than to be radioactive tomorrow.
8. We should not take an chances with the environment.
1.4
1.2
The Guardians (GS) are risk averse and are not willing to take chances especially with the
environment. They are willing to be active if necessary.
26. Who provides the information makes a difference to me; the person
must be honest. 1.2 1.1
14. Government and industry know what they are doing; they are the
experts. -1.6 -.4
The Guardians (GS) are not sure that the govemment is knowledgeable, believing that
much of the government's information comes from the industries they are supposed to regulate.
Even if government or industry has the knOWledge the Guardians (GS) are not sure they can be
trusted.
4. If environmental restrictions limit the ability of a company to make a
rofit, the restrictions should be relaxed. -1.6
-
Neither the Guardians (GS) nor the Technical Experts (TE) believe the restrictions should be
lowered for economic gain.
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17. Industry usually complies with environmental laws even when it
. costs the com an mone .
Guardians (GS) do not trust industry when the bottom line is affected.
10. It doesn't matter how much we pollute today because tomorrow's
technolo will solve the roblem.
Neither the Guardians (GS) nor the Technical Experts (TE) believe technology can solve
all the problems concerning pollution.
16. The government adequately enforces environmental laws to protect
human health and safet .
-
Statement number 16. "The government adequately enforces environmental laws to
protect human health and safety" and Number 17. "Industry usually complies with environmental
laws even when it costs them money," are the two statements that rank farthest apart. This
indicates a lack of trust with both the government and industry.
Factor B: The Technical Experts (TEl
This factor accounts for 15% of the total variance and describes the perspective of 1
citizen activist (who is confounded on factors 1 and 2), 1 neutral citizen, 3 industry and 4
government personnel.
QSORT GS TE
24. Industry, government and the public should decide together what
level of pollution should be allowed. .5 2.0 ,
31. We would all be better off if the legal procedure were easier to
follow. .4 1.6
25. All information should be shared in easily understood language as
soon as it is available. .6 1.5
The Technical Experts (TE) wish legal procedures were easier to follow too. They are
willing to allow limited citizen participation but believe they have the technical Information to make
informed decisions. They are willing to share technical information so the citizens might be better
educated.
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47. Industry must be required to recycle, reduce wastes, and use safer
techni ues and raw materials.
This is a stewardship issue that both Guardians (G8) and Technical Experts (TEl agree
on. The Technical Experts (TE) would like for all industry to have the same requirements in order
to make a level playing field.
22. Citizens should be involved in every step of a sitina decision. .7 1.3
6. Scientific risk assessment should be the major consideration in siting
decisions. -.7 1.3
Technical Experts (TE) are willing to let citizens in on the siting decisions but scientific
risk assessment should be the major deciding factor.
Neither the Technical Experts (TE) nor the Guardians (G8) show much enthusiasm for
going backwards with technoloQiY.
18. Environmental laws are full of loopholes for industry advantaae. 1.7 -1.4
38. If YOU have enouah money, YOU can oet away with pollutino. .8 -1.4
46. Government and industry skew their risk estimates to suit their own
purpose. .9 -1.4
Technical Experts (TE) believe the laws are being followed and money is not the deciding
factor in their operations or decisions.
4. If environmental restrictions limit the ability of a company to make
money, they should be relaxed. -1.8 -1.5
41. The chief function of the aovemment is to sUPpOrt the economy. -.3 -1.5
3 When jobs are scarce, an increase in employment is good even if
rthere is resultina pOllution. -1.4 -1.6
Technical Experts (TE) agree pollution should not be allowed to make more jobs.
10. It doesn't matter how much we pollute today because tomorrow's
technolo will take care of the roblem.
--
Technical Experts (TE) realize not all poUution problems can be solved by technology.
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SlmUarltles Among Perspectives
There are 7 consensus statements (Table 10A) among the factors which are particularly
salient (zscore near or greater than 1.0)
TABLE10A
CONSENSUS STATEMENTS
QITEM GS TE
47. Industry must be required to recycle, reduce waste, and use safer
techniaues and raw materials. 1.7 1.4
26. Who provides the information makes a difference to me; the person
must be honest. 1.2 1.1
25. All information must be shared in easily understood language as
soon as it is available. .6 1.5
37. It is better to be active today than to be radioactive tomorrow. 1.4 .8
45. There are clean technologies available that must be used now to
reduce pollution. 1.6 1.1
3. When jobs are scarce, an increase in employment is good even if
there is an increase in pollution. -1.4 -1.6
4. If environmental restrictions limit the ability of a company to make a I
profit, the restrictions should be relaxed. -1.8 -1.5
10. It doesn't matter how much we pollute today because tomorrow's
technology will solve the problem. -1.9 -2.1
Both perspectives agree that environmental regulation and the use of clean technologies
are necessary and that environmental-economic tradeoffs are Inappropriate. Each factor also
acknowledges the importance of sharing information involved as soon as possible. Since the
Guardians (GS) do not trust government or industry to protect their communities they want
independent access to information, whereas the Technical Experts (TE) want to share information
so they can educate the citizens on technical issues. Both agree that technology may not be able
to solve all environmental contamination problems and that preventive measures must be used.
The Technical Experts (TE) agree with the Guardians (GS) that action may be needed to protect
the environment.
Differences Among PerspectiVes
Statements that score more than one standard deviation apart across factors are
particularly helpful in explaining the differences in perspectives. Only items that differ by 1.5
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standard deviations or more will be discussed (see Appendix H for a complete list of item scores
greater than 1 standard deviation apart).
The strongest point of disagreement between the Guardians (GS) and the Technical
Experts (TE) is # 18. "Environmental laws are full of loopholes for industry advantage." This
statement shows distrust of both the government and industry by the Guardians (GS). The
Technical Experts (TE) believe industry and government are enforcing environmental laws fairly.
QITEM PS TE Dltt.
18. Environmental laws are full of loopholes for industry
advantaae. . 1.7 -1.4 3.07
16. The government adequately enforces environmenta'l
laws to protect human health and safety. -1.9 .56 -2.52
The widest margin between the factors concerns trust in government; Guardians (GS)
show their lack of trust in the government to regulate industry, but the· Technical Experts (TE)
believe government does an adequate job.
46 Government and industry skew their risk estimates to
suit their own ur ose. .95
Guardians (GS) show they do not trust risk assessments or industry to protect their
welfare, while the Technical Experts (TE) believe industry is honest and does a good job.
15. Cost effectiveness is more important to industry and
government than environmental issues. .86 -.85 1.70
38. If you have enough money, you can get away with
oollutina. .76 -1.4 2.16
17. Industry usually complies with environmental laws
even if it costs them monev. -l.B .08 -1.90
The Guardians (GS) believe money will allow one to pollute no matter what the laws are,
but the Technical Experts (TE) disagree with them. The Technical Experts (TE) do not believe
economics interfere with their environmental decisions.
24. Industry, government and the public should decide
to ether what level of ollution should be allowed. -.46
-
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-The Guardians (G8) do not trust industry or government to make siting decisions or to
make the judgment as to how much pollution should be allowed. The Technical Experts (TE)
believe risk assessments can be used to make rational decisions on siting and pollution and do
not care whether the public is included in the process.
Q Factor Validation
After initial interpretation of each factor, those participants with the highest loading of the
two factors were contacted by telephone to confirm the author's interpretations. Because
statements in the Q sort can have different meanings to different readers, confirmation of the
author's interpretation is important to validity. All participants verified the author's interpretation in
telephone conversations.
Summary
Both groups agree that environmental regulation and the use of clean technologies are
necessary and that environmental tradeoffs are inappropriate. Each factor group also
acknowledges the importance of sharing all information involved as soon as possible. Since the
Guardians (GS) do not trust government or industry, they want independent access to
information, whereas the Technical Experts (TE) want to share the information so they can
educate the public on technical issues. Both agree that action may be necessary for protection of
the environment.
Technical Experts (TE) believe that government and industry are the experts and are
acting responsibly and should be trusted to make informed decisions and that opposition is acting
irrationally or out of ignorance. They strongly believe that technical education is essential to
understanding and solving the contamination problem. They believe the current decision-making
process is fair and offers citizens ample opportunities to participate in the process. If citizens
were better educated in technical matters they would accept risk assessment as an important part
of their decision making process.
The distinguishing feature of the Guardians (GS) is their pervasive distrust of government
and industry. This distrust is based, at least in part, on the belief that economic and political
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-influence rather than environmental concerns drive the decisions made by both parties. Distrust
is also driven by the often-contradictory information given to them by the government and
industry. This distrust motivates the Guardians (GS) to insist on aggressive citizen oversight to
ensure that the environmental quality concerns of the community are protected. They are
concerned with lack of opportunity to affect siting/contamination decisions. They feel they are
included, as a token, only after the decisions have already been made. They are interested not
only in a place at the (bargaining) table but in having input into the decisions.
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-CHAPTER VIII
INTEGRATION OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
The Circle Drive/Conoeo controversy grew from problems that had arisen from the early
oil refinery days. The Marland/Conoeo Oil, Company had always taken care of the needs of the
town; it was a company town in every respect. When the contaminated groundwater began to
seep into their homes, the Circle Drive citizens expected Conoeo to start remediation of the
problem immediately. When Conoco refused' to claim ownership of the contamination, the Circle
Drive citizens lost trust in the Company and were further humiliated when many of their Ponca
City neighbors supported Conoeo. The Circle Drive citizens then took their complaint to the city,
state, and federal governments; again they felt rebuked in their efforts. They now felt they were
fighting for their health and financial future against their neighbors, Conoco, and the very state
and federal government that was supposed to protect them. As one citizen activist stated in the
personal interview, "All we had to lose now was our health and our home, why wouldn't we fight?"
It is clear from the data obtained through both R and a methodology that institutional
distrust and a "crises of legitimacy" existed at the time of the controversy in Ponca City. The
results of this research indicate that differences between Circle Drive citizens', Conoeo's and
government views relating to sense of control, perception of risks, jUdgment of fairness, technical
familiarity, scientific certainty, and most importantly, institutional distrust were the dominate
factors behind the controversy. These findings support and build upon studies such as those by
Armour (1991) and Duerg, Frankel, and Niemeczewski (1980) that have shown that community
resistance to siting proposals is linked to four important concerns: inequities in the distribution of
costs and benefits, perceived risks, feeling of loss of control over forces affecting the quality of
one's life and community, and lack of trust in proponents and regulators. These findings also
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-support Portney's (1991) risk perception conversion theory, which states that qualitative attributes
of risk objects such as familiarity, scientific uncertainly. equality in distribution of risks and
benefits, and institutional trust affect the perceived level of risk.
The four research instruments used in this study consistently produced evidence that
distrust - citizen distrust of industry and government and industry's distrust of citizens - is one
important, if not the most important, basis of this contamination controversy.
The structured questionnaire and open-ended personal interviews of stakeholders
revealed a clear lack of trust related to missing information, lack of forthrightness. and economic
agendas. A perception by industry and government that the citizens and environmental groups
and media were uneducated only added to the distrust.
Q methodology confirmed the results of the interviews and questionnaires, which
identified two perspectives among stakeholders in the Ponca City controversy. Guardians (G8)
believed the contamination in their homes was both a health and financial threat. The often-
contradictory reports from govemment sources and Conoeo denying a health threat fueled their
distrust of both government and industry. With statement #18 (Environmental laws are full of
loopholes for industry advantage), the citizens let it be known that they did not believe industry
was being regUlated correctly or that government could be trusted. Statement #46 (Government
and industry skew their risk estimates to suit their own purposes) clearly illustrates that citizens
lack institutional trust. The Guardians (GS) viewed the reports as having both economic and
political overtones because of the close working relationship between Conoeo and the
government. The Technical Experts (TE), on the other hand, did not believe there was an
immediate threat to the citizens' heahh. They disagree with statement #18. They believe
environmental laws are fair and agree wi,th #46. They do not believe industry and government
skew their risk estimates to their own advantage. The Technical Experts (TE) believed statement
#6, that scientific risk assessment should be the major consideration in siting solutions. Their
offer to lower the groundwater in the area was a scientific technically correct solution. When the
Guardians (GS) refused the offer (to lower the groundwater) they were considered uneducated,
irrational, and "hysterical." This behavior added to the distrust of citizens' and environmental
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groups by the Technical Experts (TE), who felt (statement #30) that citizens' should have their
own experts and technical and legal education.
The card ranking results further support the a methodology results in identifying the
preferred decision criteria and participatory process. Citizens distrust technical arguments and
are frustrated by their inability to influence the decision-making process. Public hearing/comment
meetings are a low power, one-way-participation process that traditionally has been used by
government. Citizens feel they have not been able to influence sit'ing or contamination issues
through this procedure. Industry is confident in the technical criteria that citizens distrust, and
believes that citizens should have a limited role in the decision-making process, at least until they
become more technically informed. State Officials are more prepared to legitimize citizens'
distrust and to encourage citizen involvement if non-adversarial participatory arrangements are
implemented. One government official who did not load on either factor has a unique point of
view in that he shares elements of both the Guardians' (GS) and the Technical Experts' (TE)
perspectives.
The following, sections reView the differences between the Guardians (GS) and the
Technical Experts (TE) that produced gridlock in the contamination controversy.
lack of Citizens' Sense of Control Produced Gridlock
Citizens were not willing to accept the decisions of the government or of Conoco
regarding the contamination in their homes and neighborhood. The citizens wanted to be
involved in the decision-making process. The decisions would affect both their health and their
financial well being and they were not willing to let those decisions be made by either industry or
the government without their input. Frustrations over a lack of control was apparent in the
interviews, as illustrated by the following quotes:
"All the decisions were being made for us; we weren't included; it was like we didn't have
good sense.n
"Nobody wanted the govemment or the attorneys involved; at first several people tried to
work individually with Conoco, but they either ignored them or insulted their intelligence."
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"All we really wanted was Conoco to sit down and talk with us one to one, but they
wouldn't do it; they never did: they had to have their lawyers."
This frustration led citizens to believe there were hidden agendas, risks, and injustices in
the decision-making process, and that industry or the government could not be trusted to protect
their community. For these reasons the citizens took matters into their own hands; unable to
obtain accurate and up to date information locally, they researched information on the state level
and even traveled out of state for information they felt might shed light on the problem.
"We couldn't get any cooperation from the company or the state or the U.S. EPA. We
had to drive to Dallas and look up everything for ourselves even though Conoco and the
state already had the information.n
"We had open meetings anyone could come, but we couldn't go to their meetings; we
were never invited.n
Industry had a different idea as to what drove the controversy.
"It was not really a health issue; it was more a money issue.n
"I think the citizens group formed because they had a groundwater problem, but I also
think they were trying to profit from the issue.n
Differences in Risk Perception Produced Gridlock
There is strong evidence from the open-ended interviews, a sorts, and decision criteria to
support the claim that differences in risk perception produced gridlock. Citizens' perception of
risks was a significant factor motivating opposition and encouraging activism as indicated in the
open-ended Interviews:
"Our health was the number one issue, property values came next. It won't do anyone
any good to have money if they are dead or have poor health."
"We were afraid the area would just be covered up, not cleaned up. Too many of the city
and state officials didn't want to cross Conaco."
"We had to get the people out of there; nobody should ever live in that area again; that
was one of our main goals.n
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As the citizens' researched the problem, their fears began to grow, but industry had a different
opinion concerning the risks involved:
"Everything needs to be risk based; we need to consider the dollars involved and tbe
risks."
USolutions need to be based on good science and not on emotions and controversy."
Lack of Fairness in the Distribution of Costs and Benefits Produced Gridlock
Q sort results indicate that both sides disagreed on the fairness and distribution of costs
of the controversy. Technical Experts (TE) did not feel they should take the technical and legal
liability for industry practices that had. gone on years before.
'We were responsible tor some of the problem and we wanted to do what was right; we
had a moral responsibility but we didn't deserve the negative publicity."
"It was wrong for the radicals to camp at the capitol. Their actions alienated Conoco."
"The bad publicity might affect our ability to stay in Ponca City in the long term."
The citizens of Circle Drive (PCTCC) were stung by the lack of support from the people of Ponca
City.
UEverybody says, Well these people bought down there, they knew Conoco wa there.'
But after we bought thirty years ago they put in two new smokestacks, another row of
tanks, and they built Carbon Black and a fertilizer plant. It's not like it used to be."
uPoncans for Progress split the city, which they accused us of doing, but the city was not
split until they formed."
"The Ponca City officials took Conoco's side, but the whole town benefited from the clean
up, not just the ones who were moved out."
Difference in Technical Familiarity Produced Gridlock
There is strong evidence to support a difference in technical familiarity produced gridlock.
Industry and government officials routinely work with technical issues and are familiar with
technical analysis. According to their decision criteria preferences, technical familiarity leads
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them to subjectively jUdge the risks as lower and increases their confidence that risks can be
controlled through technology.
Technical Experts (TE) admit they may have to change their attitude towards citizen
groups.
We, and I mean most industry, does take an arrogant attitude toward citizens groups and
complaints. We do the science, base our decisions on risk analysis, and believe we are
right. We don't explain to the public because we don't think they will understand. The
pUblic tends to factor in emotions and cultural norms that we don't.
Technical and legal education rated high with all sides in the Ponca City controversy. The
Guardians (GS) also rated access to information as one of the highest requirements on the
decision card sorts.
Differences in Belief in Scientific Certainty Produced Gridlock
Decision criteria preferences and Q sort results demonstrate the difference In
Stakeholders' views of scientific and technical criteria. Technical Experts (TE) are confident in
their views that scientific risk estimates are sufficient bases for decision making and ensure
adequate protection of public health and the environment. Their familiarity is further supported in
the Q sort results in that they believe risk analysis should be the deciding factor on
siting/contamination issues (statement #6. Scientific risk assessment should be the major
consideration in siting decisions). Guardians (GS) on the other hand did not put much trust in
scientific risk assessment, as they rated it very low in the decision-criteria card sort.
In support of technical education, one citizen activist who had a technical education and
occupation ranked risk analysis high in his Q sort, leading one to believe that technical education
and familiarity, as Technical Experts (TE) suggested, may affect the decisions about technical
analysis.
Differences in Social Trust of Institutions Produced Gridlock
Lack of institutional trust probably played the major role in the contamination controversy
in Ponca City. The situation was unique in that Conoeo had the citizens' trust and confidence in
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the beginning. When the company refused to take ownership of the problem, the government
gave conflicting heath reports, and the loeal citizens turned against the Circle Drive residents,
they lost all trust in the very institutions and people that they felt should have protected their
interest. They felt isolated and feared for their health and welfare grew. Their .attitude towards
Conoeo changed:
"Conoeo knew there was a problem; they should have done what was right to start with."
"Conoce was in total denial in the beginning; than they stated they would lower the
ground water and we could take it or leave it. Conoco was arrogant."
"It created a lot of ill feeling toward Conoeo when they had their employees take off early
and pack the meeting place so we couldn't get in."
Open-ended interviews and a sort results indicated that both industry and government
were distrusted (statement #14. Government and industry know what they are doing; they are the
experts, statement #17. Industry complies with environmental laws even when it costs them
money, and statement #18. Environmental laws are full of loopholes for industry advantage.), in
part because of the close working relationship of Conoeo with the same govemment agencies
that are supposed to regUlate the company. Distrust, as Hadden (1991) claims. motivates
citizens to seek to assert more control over the decision-making proeess (e.g., preferences for
oversight board, and increased citizen participation as indicated in their decision-criteria and
participation-strategy card sorts).
"If Conoeo had put their resources into getting along and working on the problem, the
results would have been better for both sides."
"If Conoco had did what was right instead of waiting until they were forced to act, mainly
by the news media, they could have bought out the area a lot cheaper."
The government officials felt their role was limited because there was no immediate
health threat to the citizens.
"Our laws are sometimes economically driven, not soeially driven."
'We need to be open, and share and receive information; this is critical. The agencies do
have a game plan but sometimes they're not good at sharing this information."
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"The problem just got too political, for everyone."
Conclusion
Lack of trust (especially of government) may be on the increase because of the distance
(in miles and in actions) between the citizens and their elected officials. As the Watergate break-
in, China spying episode, presidential affairs and general decline of morals with many of our
elected officials make the daily news, the trust in government declines. Many have so lost faith
with the government that they do not vote or take any responsibility for what happens in
'Washington." As one industry participant so elegantly put it:
If you go back to the first form of democratic government and the issues around your city
or village, it was ultimate democracy because if you decided, where are we going to put
the building with the moon on it and where we going to dump the garbage, you just called
all the villagers together and talked about it. And there is the ultimate citizen involvement
and the ultimate in elected government official because somebody is going to be the
mayor and the mayor is going to be accountable for making the decision. There could be
ten different places people want to put the outhouse. You can establish trust because you
can see them and you can see the decisions he or she makes, and you might even have
someone in the village who has some technical knowledge of how to run an outhouse
and you could listen to them. The problem is; as we get bigger and more complex, we
get more distant from our elected officials.
As was pointed out by the industry respondent, building trust isn't easy. Trust is very
fragile and even harder to replace once it has been lost.
The research hypothesis states that If in fact NIMBY organizations are a result of
institutional distrust and the associated "crises of legitimacy," than consideration of additional
decision criteria and the use of alternate public participation strategies incorporating these criteria
will build a foundation for consensus (Focht 1995). Legitimacy and trust are regained and
NIMBY actions avoided, not by further rationalization of the process, but through openness,
communication, and empowerment (Edelstein 1988). These are some of the elements that were
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missing in the controversy at Ponca City, which divided the citizens and resulted in turmoil and
negative publicity for the town.
In the end Ponca City gained: Conoco bought out the Circle Drive area and helped
financially to relocate the displaced citizens. A green belt has been planted between the refinery
and the residential area and the water recovery project continues to lower the ground water in the
area. While many of the Circle Drive residents were unhappy at leaving their homes and the
area, they are consoled that no one will ever live in the immediate area again.
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CHAPTER IX
Recommendations
Several recommendations for further research could come out of findings of this case
study. Different levels of contamination may elicit different responses from the public. The Circle
Drive residents had a threat that could be seen and felt (contaminated ground water seeping into
their homes and neighborhood) that caused immediate fears, and as their research grew, their
fears escalated. Unseen risks such as radiation from a proposed nuclear disposal site may also
cause unrelenting opposition by the pUblic, concerned with both their health and economic
welfare. The results may also be different for familiar events (tornadoes) vs. the unfamiliar
(earthquakes).
The culture of the community affected is often overlooked and can have a very important
influence on the outcome of controversylsiting attempts. The culture of the Circle Drive area was
mixed: by race, age of residents, level of education, and economic level. These variations all
need to be considered. The citizens activist group (PCTCC) that was formed as a result of the
controversy was a traditiona. grassroots group (ethnically mixed, female leadership) that is far
different in make-up and responses from the traditional national environmental groups
(traditionally well financed and male). The findings of this study suggest many fertile areas of
research for further study in the area of TIMBYINIMBY problems.
Recommendations for Avoiding Controversy
a methodology has shown that the contamination problem in Ponca City was not a true
conflict. Both parties wanted the same thing, remediation of the contamination. Nobody was
disagreeing on the problem but they were ta'lking around each other, not communicating. As the
conflict continued, both sides attributed ideas and thoughts to the other side that were probably
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not true. Conoeo was not a cold, heartless corporation that did not care about the citizens. The
citizen activist group was not a greedy group of rabble-rousers who wanted to take Conoeo for
everything they could. There were shades of gray on both sides of the issue.
Q methodology has shown that the two factors, the Guardians (GS) and the Technical
Experts (TE), were not really far apart. The solutions to the problems that seemed so
overwhelming can be broken down into manag.eable parts.
Determine What Citizens Wanted
The citizens of the Circle Drive area wanted:
1. AcknOWledgment they had a legitimate concern
2. Relief from the contamination
Edelstein (1988) states the inability of a community to stop a threat affects people's sense of well
being. Threatening events can shaUer people's basic assumptions about the world, giving away
to new perspectives marked by threat, danger, insecurity, and self-questioning. Edelstein
(1988:181) adds that people may experience "feelings of depression and a sense of being
helpless and disabled." When Conoeo refused to legitimize the contamination concern, the
citizens were denied acknowl.edgment that they had a problem. The Circle Drive residents were
not asking for "mansions on the hill;" they simply wanted out of the contaminated area.
Determine What Conoeo Wanted
1. To be a good corporate citizen
2. Remediation of the contamination at least cost to company
3. To avoid liability for past refinery practices
As one Circle Drive resident commented, Conoeo was afraid to acknowledge the problem for fear
of being held liable for past oil refinery practices. The negative pUblicity for the city and the
company would affect both the city and the company. It might even affect the ability of the
company to operate in the future. Everyone was talking but no one was listening.
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What a Methodology Could Have Accomplished
The conflict in Ponca City was about what each side thought the other side wanted,
~
Those involved had no way of reaching down deep inside and finding the true conflict. The Circle
Drive activists did not say in so many words that they wanted recognition for their problem.
Conoco did not say it would like to clean up the contamination but did not want the liability of
previous oil refinery practices. These are the unspoken but very important part of the equation
that must be considered along with technical risk management in decisions concerning
environmental problems.
Had the government or industry used a methodology to measure the unseen and
revealed the SUbjectivity involved in the conflict it would have defined what the problem really
was, what the participants really wanted, and how best to reach that solution for all sides of the
controversy. With a methodology, the types of pUblic participation and the salient criteria would
have been made clear. Armed with a data at the start of the controversy, people would have
been communicating, not just talking, and Ponca City could have been the model for the nation in
solving disputes.
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INITIAL QUESTIONNAIRE
Relationships and Roles In the Ponca City Controversy
The following 11 questions concern the situation that existed in south Ponca City from late 1986
until late 1990 regarding the contamination of the Circle Drive area alleged to have been caused
by the Conoeo refinery.
1. What relationship did you have with the Circle Drive area at the time of the situation?
[ ] I lived in the Circle Drive neighborhood
[ ] A member of my family lived in the Circle Drivehood
[] I own property in the Circle Drive neighborhood but did not live there
[ ] My children went to school in the Circle Drive neighborhood
[] I visited a park in the Circle Drive neighborhood
[] Other (specify), _
2. From what sources did you get information about the situation? CHECK ALL THAT
APPLY
[ ] News media
[ ] Friends and neighbors
[] Conoeo
[] Environmental groups such as the National Toxics Campaign
[ ] Fellow workers at my place of employment
[ ] The Ponca City Toxic Concerned Citizens
[ ] The Poncans For Progress
[] US EPA
[ ] Oklahoma State Department of Health
[ ] Local government[] Other (specify) _
3. Which of the sources listed in Question #2 did you most rely on and trust?
LIST TOP 3 IN ORDER.
Most Important _
Second Most Important _
Third Most Important _
Why? (Explain these choices)
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4. Which of the sources listed in Question #2 did you least rely on and trust?
LIST BOTTOM 3 IN ORDER.
Least Important _
Next to Least Important _
Third Least Important _
Why? (Explain these choices)
5. At the time of the situation, did you believe that a clean-up of the Circle Drive
neighborhood was necessary? CHECK ONLY ONE ANSWER
[] No
[) Yes
[ ] I was unsure whether a clean-up was necessary
[ ] I had no opinion one way or the other
[ ] I don't remember what my belief was then
6. How would you describe your participation in the situation at that time?
CHECK ALL THAT APPLY
[ ] I did not participate
[] I signed a petition
[] I contacted a government official
[ )1 attended a meeting of concerned citizens
[ )1 spoke at a meeting of concerned citizens
[ ] I helped organize a meeting of concemed citizens
[ ] I attended a government meeting or public hearing
[ ] I testified at a government meeting or public hearing
[ ] I participated in a rally or demonstration
[ ] I helped organize a rally or demonstration.
[) Other (specify) _
7. How often did you participate?
[ ] Never [] Seldom [ ] Occasionally [ ] Frqeuently [ ] Continuously
8. At the time of the situation, what relationship, if any, did you have with the group known
as the Ponca City Toxic Concerned Citizens (PCTCC)?
[ ] I didn't know anything about PCTCC and had no dealings with them
[ ] I knew about PCTCC but I had no dealings with them
[] I attended at least one PCTCC meeting or other function sponsored by them but I never
became an active supporter or member
[] I was an active supporter or member of PCTCC
[) Other (specify) _
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9. At the time of the shuatJon, what relationship. if any, did you have with the group known
as the Poncans for Progress (PFP)?
[] I didn't know anything about PFP[1I knew about PFP but I had no dealings with them
[ ) I attended at least one PFP meeting or other function sponsored by them but I never
became an active supporter or member
[ ] I was an active supporter or member of PFP[] Other (specify) _
10. What relationship did you have with Conoeo before or during that period of time?
[ ]1 had no employee or business relationship with Conoeo before or during the period of
the situation
[ ]1 was a Conoeo employee during at least some of the period of the situation
[ ]1 was a Conoeo employee before the situation began but not during it
[ ] I had a non-employee business relationship with Conoeo during at least some of the
period of the situation
[ ] I had a non-employee business relationship with Conoeo before the situation began but
not during it[] Other (specify) _
11. What relationship did any family member of your household (other than you) have with
Conoco before or during that period? CHECK ALL THAT APPLY
[ ] No household family member had an employee or business relationship with Conoeo
before or during the period of the situation
[ ] At least one household family member was a Conoeo employee during at least some of
the period of the situation
[ ] At least one household family member was a Conoeo employee before the situation
began, but no member was a Conoeo employee during it
[ ] At least one household family member had 8 non-employee business relationship with
Conoeo during at least some of the period of the situation
[ ] At least one household family member had a non-employee business relationship with
Conoeo before the situation began, but no member had a business relationship with
them during it
[) Other {specify) _
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FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE
Demographic Characteristics
1. How close did you live to the Conoco refinery during the time of the dispute?
2. Are you now an active member of any citizens' group or service organization (other than
the PCTCC or PFP)?
[] No [I Yes
3. How often do you participate in these organizations' activities?
[] Never [] Seldom [ ] Occasionally [ ] Frequently [ I Continuously
4. How old are you? _
5. Gender
[] Female [] Male
6. What is the highest level of formal education you have attained? _
7. What was your major subject of study in school? _
8. What is (or was, if retired) your primary occupation? _
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OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW SCRIPT
1. How long have you lived in the Ponca City area? _
2. Let's talk about the Circle Drive cleanup situation. I am interested in your opinions and
recollections of events that occurred then. I understand that you played an active role in
the events that occurred then.
Is that correct? _ In what way, can you give me examples?
3. About when did you get involved? (ask for a date)
4. Why did you decide to get involved? (If several reasons are given, after they list them, ask
which are most important)
a. Concerns and motives?
b. What do you think would have happened if you had not got involved?
5. Did anyone influence your involvement? (if yes, ascertain the relationship of the person to
the respondent; e.g., family relative, friend, neighbor, fellow worker, stranger, organization,
etc.)
(If no, prObe-newspaper article, TV, etc.)
6. What were your concerns about the cleanup of the Circle Drive area?
(Any concerns, not necessarily environmental)
[Add important concerns to the card deck used in the ranking and sorting task, if they are
not already represented there. Star items that need to be added to deck]
7. Which of these concerns were most important to you?
8. Apparently, there were some people who agreed with the cleanup proposals and some
who disagreed. What things about the cleanup do you think most people agreed on?
9. Is there anything that could have been done to bring most people in agreement about the
cleanup? [Why or why not?]
10. I want to ask you now about how things have changed in the community since the time you
were active in the situation. How would you say things have changed in Ponca City
economically since that time? [gotten better, worse, less jobs, etc.]
III
11. How have things changed insofar as your sense ofcommunity; in other words, how you
view Ponca City as a place to live and what Ponca City means to you?
[people not as friendly as before, community has become stigmatized, neighborhood
disruption, traditions abandoned or changed, etc.]
12. Does the Conoeo refinery seem to be as much of a health or environmental threat to you
now as it had then? Why?
Now, I want to ask you whether or not the cleanup situation could have been handled differently.
I am interested in your views of what things could have been done in dealing with the cleanup to
better serve all members of your community.
13. Let's first talk about govemment's dealings with the cleanup.
What things did EPA, OSDH, and local government officials do right in presenting the proposal to
the community?
14. What did EPA, OSDH, and local govemment officials do wrong?
15. What should EPA, OSDH, and local government officials have done in handling this issue
that would have best served all members of the community?
16. Now, let's talk about industry.
What things did Conoeo or DuPont officials do right in presenting the proposal to the community?
17. What did Conoeo and DuPont officials do wrong?
18. What should Conoeo and DuPont have done in handling this issue that would have best
served all members of the community?
19. Finally, lers talk about the citizens of your community.
What things did citizens do right in dealiing with the cleanup proposal?
20. What did citizens do wrong?
21 . What should citizens have done in handling this issue that would have best served all
members of the community?
22. Is there anything else that you would like to tell me about your feelings, concerns or
suggestions about the Circle Drive cleanup situation or about hazardous waste cleanups in
general that we haven't covered so far?
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OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW
QUESTIONS FOR STATE GOVER MENT EMPLOYEE
I have been interviewing citizens involved in the south-side contamination problem (1986 to 1990)
in Ponca City, and I would like your opinion, from the state's point of view, of the activities that
took place.
What was your role with the state in the south-side problem?
Did you visit the area in Ponca City at any time during the controversy?
AT THE TIME OF THE CONTROVERSY:
How did the state feel about the situation, how did you see things happening at the time?
What did you believe was the main concern of the citizens group at the time?
Has your opinion changed today?
After the state assured people there wasn't any health threat and they continued to protest, what
was the state's feeling towards the citizens?
What was the state's feeling toward Conoeo at the time?
How do you think Conoeo felt about the situation at the time?
What do you believe was Conoeo's main concem about the controversy?
What was Conoeo's attitude toward the citizens group?
Did you feel Conoeo felt any responsibility for the contamination?
How do you think the citizens felt towards the state at the time?
What was the citizens attitude towards Conoeo at the start of the situation?
Do you believe the citizens attitude towards Conoeo changed as the controversy went on?
IN THE FUTURE:
From a state agency's point of view, what would be the best way for a citizens group to go about
getting information and help with a problem like this?
How could the south-side problem have been handled that would have been better for everyone
involved?
What did Conoeo do right? Wrong?
What should Conoeo do different?
What did the citizens do right? Wrong?
What should the citizens group do different?
Do you believe camping on the capital lawn helped or hindered their case?
What did the state do right? Wrong?
What should the state do different?
In making environmental cleanup and siting decisions in the future, how can we avoid gridlock
and get to negotiation instead of litigaUon?
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OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW
QUESTIONS FOR CONOCO
I have been interviewing citizens involved in the south-side contamination problem (1986 to 1990)
in Ponca City and I would like your observation and opinions from both Conoeo and your own
personal point of view, of the activities that took place..
What was your position with Conoco at the time of the south-side problem?
Did you live in the Ponca City area at the time of the controversy?
AT THE TIME OF THE CONTROVERSY?
How did you perceive Conoeo felt about the situation at the time?
What was Conoeo's main concern about the controversy?
What responsibility did Conoeo feel for the contamination?
Concerning relations with the state, what we Conoco's feeling toward the OSDH?
What the state easy to work with? If not, why?
Did the OSDH appear to be taking the PCTCC complaints seriously?
From your point of view, what was the state's attitude towards Conoeo at the time?
Did this attitude change as the controversy went on? Or afterwards?
How has the controversy affected your working relationship with the state, has there been any
change?
CONCERNING THE PCTCC GROUP:
Why do you think the PCTCC fonned in the first place, what were their motives?
What did you believe was the main concern of the citizens group al the time?
Has your opinion changed today?
What was Conoeo's attitude toward the peTCC group? Your personal attitude?
Was the PCTCC group easy to work with? Why?
What was the PCTCC attitude towards Conoeo at the start of the situation?
Do you believe their attitude towards Conoeo changed as the controversy went on?
If so, how?
IN THE FUTURE:
How could the south-side problem have been handled that would have been better for everyone
involved?
What did Conoeo do right? Wrong?
What should Conoeo do different?
What did the state do right? Wrong?
What should the state do different?
What did the PCTCC group do right? Wrong?
What should a citizens group do different?
In making environmental cleanup and siting decisions in the future, how can we avoid gridlock
and get to negotiation instead of litigation?
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CARD DECK Nl
CRITERIA IMPORTANT TO
COMMUNITYENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING
CARD Nl: Economic Impact on the Community
Community environmental cleanup decisions can affect the economic health of the community.
Economic benefits could include creation ofjobs~ increase in tax revenue~ compensation in the
form ofcash payments; and improvements to parks, horaries, schools, or hospitals. Economic
costs could include loss of tourism, change in land use, traffic disruption, and increases in demand
for community services.
I believe that economic impact on the community sbouJd be important in making
community environmental cleanup decisions.
CARD #2: Economic Impact on the Company
Private companies want to make a profit to stay in business. Ability to make a profit can be
affected by various costs, including costs of environmental remediation, compliance with
regulations, construction and operation, legal liability. compensation payments to the community,
and limits on how the company may operate.
I believe that a company's ability to make a profit should be important in making
community environmental cleanup decisions.
CARD N3: Scientific Risk Estimates
Scientific experts in government and industry claim that they can scientifically measure risk to
human health and the environment. To estimate the rislc that may result from a harmful event,
theY multiply the seriousness of the potential harm by how likely it is that the harm may happen.
I believe that .cientific risk asscssmenu should be important in making community
environmental cleanup decuions.
CARD #4: PersonalJudgments 01Risk
People often make judgments about whether to accept or avoid risks. Factors that may be
important in judging environmental risk include personal familiarity and understanding of the risk
involved, whether the risks are voluntary and controUable, whether experts agree on the amount
of risk, whether children or future generations are affected, and whether the risks are reversible or
have delayed effects.
I believe that citizens' judgments or risk should be important in making community
environmental cleanup decisions.
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CARD #5: Access to Information
The ability to easily obtain relevant information in a timely manner and in an understandable way
can help people make wonned decisions. This- is especially true ifthe decision involves complex
issues where it is important to consider all ofthe facts.
I believe that assurance ofcitizens' timely accas to relevant iDformatioDshould be
important in making commuDity environmental cleanup decisions.
CARD #6: Personal Views Toward Techn%gy
Some people claim that continuing advances in technology are important to improving quality of
life. Others question whether reliance on technology is always a good thing. For example, some
people believe that some technologies create more harm than good and should not be used.
I believe that citizen's views toward a technology should be important in making
community environmental cleanup decisions.
CARD #7: Fairness
Even though a decision may produce a community benefit when all costs and'benefits are added
up, some 'citizens or neighborhoods may experience more hann than good and other citizens or
neighborhoods may experience more good than hann. Some people may consider that an unequal
distribution ofcosts, benefits, and risks in a community is unfair.
I believe that the fairness of the distribution of benefia, costl, and risks should be
important in making community environmental cleanup decisions.
CARD #8: Trust in Government and IndJlstry
Trust has different meanings. For example, acting in the commonty's best interests (being a good
neighbor), credibility (truthfulness, believability), and openness (accessibility, forthrightness), may
each be important to judgments about whether a person or organization is trustworthy.
I believe that citizens' level of trust in government and industry sbould be important in
making community environmental cleanup decision••
CARD 1#9: Understanding Local Culture
Communities vary in their traditions, customs. values, attitudes and identities. Decisions that can
affect a community may require that decision makers be knowledgeable about the local culture.
Since different communities and regions of the nation have different cultures. it is not always easy
to know what local values may be.
I believe that an adequate consideration of the local community's culture and values should
be important in making community environmental cleanup decisioDJ.
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CARD #10: Community Disruption
Enviromnental cleanup activities may disrupt the normal flow of a community. For example,
rerouting oftraflic, separation of one neighborhood from another, and loss ofreputation may
cause a decline in a sense ofcommunity and an intenuption of long-held traditions.
I believe that consideration of the potential for community disruption .hould be important
in making community environmental cleanup decisions.
CARD #11: Citizen Involvement
Some citizens choose to become actively involved in decisions that affect their community or
them personally. The amount ofinvolvement not only depends on their willingness and ability to
panicipate, but also on the opportunities that the decision process offers for participation.
I believe that the provision of adequate opportunities for citizen involvement should be
important in making community environmental cleanup decis~ltns.
CARD #12: Technical and Legal Education
DC\o~~iuu~ about the cleanup of community environmental contamination involve various technical
and legal issues. Technical issues may include the proper measurement oflong tenn health risks,
whether a technology will operate as it was designed, and what the odds are ofa plant upset or
spill that would result in a major environmental threat to the community. Legal issues may
include how to understand complicated laws and regulations and what procedures apply in the
decision making process. Many ofthese issues are difficult to understand without technical and
legal training.
I believe tbat assurances of adequate training in relevant technical and legal area! should
be important in making community environmental cleanup decision•.
CARD #13: Alternative Technologies
It used to be commonplace for waste to be disposed ofby dumping it into landfills and open pits.
Recently, there have been efforts to find alternatives to land disposal. One approach is to develop
new manufacturing and processing techniques that do not generate toxic waste. for example, by
recycling wastes back into the process or by the use ofless dangerous raw materials. For those
toxic wastes that cannot be eliminated, new and innovative waste treatment methods are being
developed that can convert them into non-toxic forms without creating emissions or discharges to
the environment.
I believe that preference for alternative technologies luch as recydina and non-emitting
wute treatment should be important in making community environmental deanup
decisions.
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CARD DECK #2: CIIIZEN PARTICIPATION STRATEGIES
CARD #1: Preemption
The expertise ofgovernment officials is relied on to make cleanup decisions. The public is
effectively excluded from participating directly in the decision making process.
I believe that community environmental cleanup decisions should be made by
experts in government and industry.
CARD #2: Public Comment andHearing
The government makes a tentative cleanup decision. announces it to the public, considers
comments received from the public, and then makes a final decision.
I believe that community environmental cleanup decisioDJ should be made by the
government, but only after the public has had a chance to comment on tbe
proposals.
CARD #3: Consultation
Government conducts public meetings, distributes information. conducts surveys, and asks
for comments throughout the entire cleanup decision process. Government considers all
public comments before making cleanup decisions.
I believe tbat community environmental cleanup decisions should be made by tbe
government, but the public should be allowed to voice its concerns throughout tbe
entire decision making process.
CARD #4: Non-Binding Negotiation
Company officials are required to enter into preliminary negotiations with citizen
representatives of the community. Any agreement that may be reached will be delivered
to government decision makers for their consideration. However, the final cleanup
decision will be made by the government. Its decision mayor may not include any or all
ofthe agreement.
I believe tbat the citizens of a community and tbe company should be allowed to try
to reacb an agreement before the government makes community environmental
cleanup decisions.
CARD #5: Third Party Mediation
A neutral third party attends all meetings between citizen representatives of the
community and the company concerning the environmental cleanup ofthe community.
The mediator attempts to help the parties to reach an agreement. This agreement is then
forwarded to the government for their consideration; however, the government is free to
include none, part, or all ofthe agreement in its decisions.
I believe tbat a mediated agreement between the community and tbe com.pany
sbould be reached before the government makes community environmental cleanup
120
decisions; bowever, the government may pick and cboose which, ifauy, parts of the
agreement to include in its decisions.
CARD~: BindingArbitration
A fixed period oftime (e.g., one year) is provided to allow community and industry
representatives to try to reach a voluntary agreement on how environmental cleanup ofa
community would be accomplished. Ifno agreement is reached during this time, an
experienced arbitrator will consider the positions, ofboth parties and develop a document
that binds both parties. Industry is required to pay for, but the citizens select, the
arbitrator. Subject to verification oflegality, the government is required to attach the
agreement to its pennit and enforce it as part of its oversight dunes.
I believe tbat an independent arbitrator should be brougbt in to resolve any disputes
between citizens and industry concerning community environmental cleanups and
that the government should be required to enforce tbe arbitrator'. decisions.
CARD #7: Oversight Board
A.a., oversight board composed ofan equal number ofcitizens (selected by a consensus of
public interest groups in the community), industry representatives, and government
representatives provides continuous control of the entire decision making process. All
parties agree to abide by the oversight board's decisions.
I believe that an ovenight board, composed ofequal numben of I'1!presentatives
from government, industry, and self-selected citizens, should be used to ovenee the
entire decision making process concerning community environmental cleanups.
CARD #8: Referendum
Any community environmental cleanup proposal must be approved by a vote of the
majority of the community before it can take effect.
I believe that community environmental cleanup proposab should be approved by a
majority vote of the citizens of a community before they can take efl'ect.
CARD ##9: Citizen Control
The community itselfcontrols the community enviromnental cleanup decision process. A
citizens' committee, whose representatives are chosen by members ofvarious
enviromnental, community action, neighborhood development, and other citizens' groups,
make all decisions. The government and industry are bound by the decisions ofthe
committee and must provide whatever funds are necessary to comply with the decisions of
the committee.
I bdieve that community environmental cleanup decision. should be made solely by
the citizens of a community and that industry and government should be bound by
those decisions.
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QUESTIONS FOR Q SORT
1. Waste facility siting means economic growth and prosperity for the community.
2. Offering cash payments to a community is the same as a bribe
3. When jobs are scarce, an increase in employment is good even if there is resulting pollution.
4. If environmental restrictions limit the ability of a company to make a profit. the restrictions
should be relaxed.
5. Industry works with communities to maintain a good pubHc image.
6. Scientific risk assessment should be the major consideration in siting decisions.
7. Citizens need to control which risks they have to put up with.
8. We should not take any chances with the environment.
9. I tolerate risk as a fact of life, but I don't like it.
10. It doesn't matter how much we pollute today because tomorrow's technology will solve the
problem.
11. The world would be a beUer place to live if we could go back to the 'good old days'.
12. It is better to put facilities in communities with high unemployment; the people there need the
jobs.
13. The people who benefit the most from a waste facility are not the ones who bear the risks.
14. Govemment and industry know what they are doing; they are the experts.
15. Cost effectiveness is more important to industry and govemment than environmental Issues.
16. The government adequately enforces environmental laws to protect human health and
safety.
17. Industry usually complies with environmental laws even when it costs them money.
18. Environmental laws are full of loop holes for industry advantage.
19. The character of a community changes after a waste facility is located there.
20. Allowing a waste facility to locate in a community divides the community.
21. Waste facilities give a community a bad reputation.
22. Citizens should be involved in every step of a siting decision.
23. Citizens have amole opportunity to be involved in siting decisions in their communities.
24. Industry, government and the public should decide together what level of pollution should be
allowed.
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25. All infonnation should be shared in easily understood language as soon as it is available.
26. Who provides the infonnation makes a difference to me; the person must be honest.
27. It's really hard to know if the decisions makers have the same values as I do.
28. It is impossible to know whether or not a process is really safe without adequate technical
education.
29. If the public were more familiar with the operation of a waste facility, they would be more
willing to consider it.
30. Citizens should have their own experts.
31. We would all be better off if the legal procedures were easier to follow.
32. Government shouldn't be trusted in making siting decisions.
33. Government uses citizen opinions against them.
34. Economic special interests have too much influence in siting decisions.
35. The people living in the community know best what is good for them.
36. Citizens should initially oppose all proposals for siting by industry.
37. It is better to be active today than to be radioactive tomorrow.
38. If you have enough money, you can get away with polluting.
39. Conflict in decision making is necessary and healthy.
40. Consensus is impossible when activists become involved In environmental decisions.
41. The chief function of the government is to support the economy.
42. Just being physically present in situations where environmental decisions are made is not
enough.
43. The siting process is unfair because the results provide greater risks to people who are
ethnically different or poor.
44. Environmental radicals are necessary to bring balance to the issues.
45. There are clean technologies available that must be used now to reduce pollution.
46. Government and industry skew their risk estimates to suit their own purposes.
47. Industry must be required to recycle, reduce waste and use safer techniques and raw
materials.
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~TABLE A·1
DECISION CRITERIA CARD SORT RESULTS
DECISION CRITERIA CARDS C1 C2 C3 CS C6 C8 C9 C10 C11 G13 G14 120
Economic Impact Community 11 12 11 12 4" 5" 11 11 5 12 11 8
Economic Impact Company 12 8 10 13 13 13 13 6 9 13 10 10
Scientific Risk Estimates 10 13 7 1" 12 8* 8 8 12 ,* 2* 2*
Personal Judgment Risks 9 4* 12 6 5" 3* 6 10 7 9 5 4·
Access to Information 3* 6 2" 5 6 2· ,* ,* 2· 2* ,* 1·
Personal Views Technology 13 3" 9 7 7 11 10 9 6 8 13 6*
Fairness 2* 9 3" 9 2* 10 2* 4* ," 5 9 11
Institutional Trust 8 11 ," 4 ,* 4* 3* 3* 13 10 12 7
Understanding local Culture 6 5 5* 10 11 12 12 12 10 11 8 12
COOlmunity Disruption 7 10 13 11 8 9 7 7 3" 4" 6* 13
Citizen Involvement 5 7 4· 8 3* 1* 4* 2" 4* 3* 3* 5*
Technicalilegal Education
'"
2* 6 2· 9 7· 5* 13 8 6 4· 9
Alternative Technologies 4* ,* 8 3* 10 6· 9 5 11 7 7 3*
-N
-.J
Factor GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS TE TE TE
*Bolded numbers represent most preferred,
italicized numbers represent somewhat preferred
numbers in normal font represent not preferred.
Factor -
GS =Guardians. TE =Technical Experts
TABLE A-2:
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF DECISION CRITERIA CARD RANKINGS
GUARDIANS (GS)
Criterion
Community Economic Impact
Company Economic Impact
Scientific Risk Estimates
Personal Judgment of Risk
Access to Information
Personal Views Toward Technology
Fairness
Trust in Government/Industry
Understanding Local Culture
Community Disruption
Citizen Involvement
Technical and Legal Education
Alternative Technologies
Frequency Distribution (Important)
Highly Somewhat Not
225
036
2 4
32
630
1 5 3
6 2 1
522
1 3 5
1 5 3
6 2 1
5 3 1
441
TABLE A-3
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF DECISION CRITERIA CARD RANKINGS
TECHNICAL EXPERTS (TE)
Criterion
Community Economic Impact
Company Economic Impact
Scientific Risk Estimates
Personal Judgment of Risk
Access to Information
Personal Views Toward Technology
Fairness
Trust in Government/Industry
Understanding Local Culture
Community Disruption
Citizen Involvement
Technical and Legal Education
Alternative Technologies
Frequency Distribution (Important)
HI.ghly Somewhat Not
o 1 1
1 5 1
j 0 0
120
21
120
03
0
021
210
12
0
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APPENDIX G
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PARTICIPATION STRATEGY CARD RANKINGS
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TABLE A-4
PARTICIPATION CRITERIA CARD SORT RESULTS
PARTICIPATION STRATEGIES Cl C2 C3 CS C6 C8 C9 CI0 Cll Gl3 Gl4 120
Pre-emption 6 9 9 6 8 9 8 1· 4 7 8 3·
Public Hearing/Comment 2· 6 2* 3* 6· 6 2· 7 ,* 2" 3* 4
Consultation 5 7 8 5 9 7 1* 8 2· ,* 2* 8
Non-Binding Agreement 4 3* 4 2· 2* 5 7 9 5 4· 7 ,*
Mediation 7 8 5 8 3* 8 6 3· 7 3* 5 5
Binding Arbitration 8 4 6 1· 7· 2* 3" 6 6 5" 6 6
Oversight Board ,* ,* ,* 4* 4* ,. 4* 4* 3" 3· 1· 2*
Referendum 3" 2* 7 9 5" 4" 5 5 8 6 4" 7
Citizen Control 9 5 3- 7 ,. 3" 9 2" 9 9 9 9
Factor GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS GS TE TE" TE
"Bolded numbers represent most preferred,
...... italicized numbers represent somewhat preferred1M0
numbers in normal font represent not preferred..
Factor-
GS::;;; Guardians, TE= Technical Experts
TABLE A-5
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PARTICIPATION STRATEGY CARD RANKINGS
GUARDIANS (GS)
Criterion
Pre-emption
Public Hearing/Comment
Consultation
Non-binding Agreement
Mediation
Binding Arbitration
Oversight Board
Referendum
Citizen Control
Frequency Distribution (Important)
Highly Somewhat Not
144
630
243
360
1 2
441
810
423
TABLE A-6
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF IPARTICIPATION STRATEGY CARD RANKINGS
TECHNICAL EXPERTS (TE)
Criterion
Pre-emption
Public Hearing/Comment
Consultation
Non-binding Agreement
Mediation
Binding Arbitration
Oversight Board
Referendum
Citizen Control
Frequency Distribution (Important)
Highly Somewhat Not
120
21
2 0 1
10
12
1 1 1
201
1 1 1
003
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APPENDIX H
DESCENDING ARRAY OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FACTORS A AND FACTORS B
(DIFFERENCES GREATER THAN ONE)
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TABLE A-7
DESCENDING ARRAY OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FACTORS A AND B
(DIFFERENCE GREATER THAN ONE)
Factor Factor Dlff.
A B
18. Environmental laws are full of loopholes for industry advanta~e. 1.7 -1.4 3.1
46. Government and industry skew their risk estimates to suit their .9 -1.4 2.4
own.
38. If yOU have enouoh money, yoU can get away with polluting. .76 -1.4 2.4
15. Cost effectiveness if more important industry and government .86 -.85 1.7
than environmental issues.
32. Government shouldn't be trusted in making siting decisions. .82 -.87 1.7
8. We should not take any chances with the environment. 1.2 .02 1.2
41. The chief function of the government is to support the economy. -.34 -1.5 1.2
34. Economic special interest have too much influence in siting .95 -.17 1.1
decisions.
31. We would all be better off jf the legal procedures were easier to .42 1.6 -1.1
understand.
30. Citizens should have their own experts. -.30 .93 -1.2
14. and industry know what they are doing:; they are the experts. -1.8 ·.45 -1.3
29. If the public were more familiar with the operations of a waste -.85 .66 -1.5
facility, they would be more willing to accept it.
24. Industry, government and the public should decide together what -.46 2.0 -1.5
level of pollution should be allowed.
17. Industry usually complies with environmental laws even when it -1.8 .08 -1.9
costs them money.
6. Scientific risk assessment should be the major considerations in -.70 1.3 -2.0
siting decisions.
16. The government adequately enforces environmental laws to -2.0 .56 -2.5
protect human health and welfare.
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